Slavery, secession, Civil War issues

[Jeffrey]

Lincoln wrote, "I made the peremptory proclamation on what appeared to me to be a military necessity."

[Devilwin]

Never said Grant's campaign wasn't a victory. History shows otherwise. I merely pointed out it was a series of engagements, Grant trying to break Lee, failing, but moving south instead of retreating as his predecessors. Grant believed in total war. I am not so sure it was necessary to unleash his raiders Sherman and Sheridan on a helpless civilian populace the way they did. The southern armies were depleted, and it seems more like vindictiveness rather than strategy to me.
As for Lee not being an American general, I beg to differ. Just because the southern states rebelled, didn't make them no less "American" than their esteemed foes.
Grant agreed with letting the south up easy, as did Lincoln. They knew to try Lee and other southern generals for treason would lead to more fighting and hardship, for both sides.

Books:
Year of Destiny, The Life and Battles of Jeb Stuart and His Cavalry, by Monte Akers.
From Manassas to Appomattox, by James Longstreet.
Never Call Retreat, by Bruce Catton.
Mr Lincoln's Army, by Bruce Catton.
These are just some I've read, got several more in the bookcase.

[Bob Green]

I am not so sure it was necessary to unleash his raiders Sherman and Sheridan on a helpless civilian populace the way they did. The southern armies were depleted, and it seems more like vindictiveness rather than strategy to me.

War is a nasty, nasty affair.

For example, March 9 & 10, 1945 when the United States utilized 334 B-29 Superfortress bombers to firebomb Tokyo:

http://www.eyewitnesstohistory.com/tokyo.htm

Wherever there was a canal, people hurled themselves into the water; in shallow places, people waited, half sunk in noxious muck, mouths just above the surface of the water. Hundreds of them were later found dead; not drowned, but asphyxiated by the burning air and smoke. In other places, the water got so hot that the luckless bathers were simply boiled alive.

The results were devastating: almost 17 square miles of the city were reduced to ashes. Estimates of the number killed range between 80,000 and 200,000, a higher death toll than that produced by the dropping of the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima or Nagasaki six months later.

[Devilwin]

You're absolutely right Bob. But herein lies the difference. Men who had lately been fellow citizens could hardly be called "sworn enemies." The two armies' pickets often got together during the war when officers weren't looking, and exchanged tobacco for coffee, newspapers, etc.
Lee and his army were part of the old way, cavalier and courteous, doing things in the manner of gentlemen from that antebellum period. Grant was the new warrior, with a basilisk's gaze, hard and total war. It was the old way vs the new way. The war changed everything we knew about waging war.
I was just reading about some pickets getting together across the James river in 1864. The yankees remarked that the southern boys needed new clothes, as the ones they had weren't fit for wearing.
One of the southerners told him, "It's fine, you see, we'uns don't wear our best clothes to slaughter hogs". Thought that was funny..

[Karl Beem]

You're absolutely right Bob. But herein lies the difference. Men who had lately been fellow citizens could hardly be called "sworn enemies." The two armies' pickets often got together during the war when officers weren't looking, and exchanged tobacco for coffee, newspapers, etc.
Lee and his army were part of the old way, cavalier and courteous, doing things in the manner of gentlemen from that antebellum period. Grant was the new warrior, with a basilisk's gaze, hard and total war. It was the old way vs the new way. The war changed everything we knew about waging war.
I was just reading about some pickets getting together across the James river in 1864. The yankees remarked that the southern boys needed new clothes, as the ones they had weren't fit for wearing.
One of the southerners told him, "It's fine, you see, we'uns don't wear our best clothes to slaughter hogs". Thought that was funny..

Oh please!

[Olympic Fan]

IMO, Lee's first Northern invasion (which was tactically inconclusive) created serious concern for Lincoln. His two responses were replacing McClellan with Burnside and issuing the Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation just five days after Antietam.

No, the battle of Antietam was tactically inconclusive ... Lee's 1962 invasion of Maryland was a failure. Lincoln had actually written his Emancipation Proclamation in July and showed it to his cabinet in late summer. At the time, Secretary of State William Seward (who was far more radical as an abolitionist than Lincoln) suggested that issuing the proclamation in a time of defeat would appear (especially to England and France) as a matter of desperation. Seward advised that Lincoln wait for a military success to issue the proclamation.

That's just what happened. While we now view Antietam as a tactical draw, at the time, it was widely perceived as a Union victory because Lee withdrew from Maryland and returned to Confederate territory. He accomplished none of his goals behind the invasion -- he did not rally any significant confederate support in Maryland and he did not inspire any European nation to recognize the Confederacy. All he did was supply Lincoln with an excuse to issue the Emancipation Proclamation.

And McClellan was not fired for "losing" Antietam ... he was fired for his refusal to pursue Lee's army as it withdrew. McClellan took six weeks after the engagement at Antietam to begin moving in pursuit of Lee ... and a ridiculous nine days to cross the Potomac. Finally, Lincoln was fed up enough to dismiss him on Nov. 5.

You're absolutely right Bob. But herein lies the difference. Men who had lately been fellow citizens could hardly be called "sworn enemies." The two armies' pickets often got together during the war when officers weren't looking, and exchanged tobacco for coffee, newspapers, etc.
Lee and his army were part of the old way, cavalier and courteous, doing things in the manner of gentlemen from that antebellum period. Grant was the new warrior, with a basilisk's gaze, hard and total war. It was the old way vs the new way. The war changed everything we knew about waging war.
I was just reading about some pickets getting together across the James river in 1864. The yankees remarked that the southern boys needed new clothes, as the ones they had weren't fit for wearing.
One of the southerners told him, "It's fine, you see, we'uns don't wear our best clothes to slaughter hogs". Thought that was funny..

Oh, come on. Have you read anything about the deprecations committed by Lee's Army during its invasion of Pennsylvania in 1863. Do you think Jeb Stuart respected private property on his rides around the Union army. The fact is that for most of the war, Lee and his army fought on their own territory and limited the destruction. But when they did leave the South, they were every bit as destructive as the Union troops in the South. You think Heth's men were headed to Gettysburg to "buy" shoes? "Cavalier and courteous," give me a break.

You comment about men who had lately been fellow citizens not being "sworn enemies" -- again, to the men of the North, they were traitors, trying to destroy the Union. That certainly was a source of considerable bitterness. And even the destruction visited by Sherman and Sheridan was nothing new in war ... read about the 30 Years War more than 200 years earlier. Read about the depredations of the Napoleonic War in Spain and Russia. Heck, Epaminondas of Thebes used the same scorched earth tactics to destroy the Spartan empire (another empire built on slavery)
four centuries before Christ. Rome used very similar tactics to destroy Carthage as a commercial rival. There was nothing new about it.

And, I'm sure the pickets on the two sides got along great ... but so did the Germans and French in the early part of WWI -- read about the famous Christmas celebration in No Man's Land in 1914. What's that supposed to mean?

PS -- glad to see you rejoin the debate devilwin ... still curious about the books you've read to get your information.

[gumbomoop]

The myth of states rights as the basis for secession remains a strong narrative in southern culture. I have many college educated relatives in the south who cling unrepentantly to this belief. I know why, we all know why, but it's an impermissible discussion.

Yes, a powerful, mythic narrative.

I'm interested in, but uncertain about, why you think it impermissible to discuss the powerful hold of this myth. Do you mean impermissible on DBR because of PPB problems? Or impermissible because such a discussion with or about folks who hold to this myth quickly degenerates into name-calling and even bridge-burning?

I'm not trying to egg you on, and I've no right to be disappointed if you prefer to let your statement stand as is.

But for me, it's not impermissible to discuss the power of the myth here. Possibly I've already overstepped some bounds, but I hope not, and think not. Indeed, in my original post over on the "What are you reading?" thread, I opined that the uncomplicated explanation is that many Southerners are simply, obviously, and understandably embarrassed that somehow their forebears countenanced slavery, perhaps owned slaves. Moderns prefer to distance family histories from slavery, and need to see forebears as honorably defending their homeland from Yankee invaders, their states from federal, intrusive centralizers. Rather than dishonorably defending an inhumane institution.

At the simplest level, this "embarrassment factor" goes a good way in explaining why, as you say, "The myth of states rights as the basis for secession remains a strong narrative in southern culture."

Now, I'd be interested in "thinking aloud" with you and anyone else about myth-believing friends and family. How would they react to being told that while their distaste for slavery is altogether admirable, they must understand the straightforward, non-controversial fact that 19th-century Southerners were not embarrassed by an institution they thought "the natural condition" of black slaves. Discussing this 19th-century Southern reality isn't to excuse it, but just to acknowledge it, and so contrast it with our admirable-enough disgust at human bondage.

But ... If by "we all know why" you mean something different -- that it's less the "embarrassment factor" than something much harder, i.e., racism -- then, ok, calling out friends and family as racists is difficult almost beyond imagining.

[ncexnyc]

There seems to be some question as to why Lee's effort during the Seven Days Campaign is viewed differently than that of Grant's during the Wilderness Campaign so let's try this simple analogy.

Duke opens the ACC season against a team that has lost just one game and is ranked several spots higher in all of the polls because that team has been more impressive up to that point. Duke wins the game and everyone on DBR is happy and all you'll read on the threads is how Coach K. did such a masterful job with his halftime adjustments and how he managed the last two minutes of a back and forth affair.

Now fast forward the calendar, it's the next to the last game of the season when these two teams meet again. Duke has been rolling and is playing its best basketball of the season, unfortunately the other team has lost two of its best players and now has more losses than wins. Duke wins the game by 20+, and nowhere in the press or on this board do we find any comments about what a great job Coach K. did.

So it looks pretty obvious to me. The outcome of the war was in serious question during the Seven Days Campaign, however by the time of the Wilderness Campaign, most people view the war as over and it's just a matter of time before the South throws in the towel.

I'm also curious that there seems to be some interesting numbers being thrown around for the Wilderness Campaign. The numbers I'm seeing from several different sources have Union casualties at around 17,000 and Confederate casualties at around 11,000. The numbers I'm seeing include killed, wounded, and captured.

I'd also like to throw this out there since some people feel casualties determine who won or lost a battle. Try these numbers on for size:
Side A: Approximately 20,000 casualties, killed, wounded, missing, and captured
Side B: Approximately 51,000 casualties, and these numbers don't include wounded or missing
Who came out ahead here?

[wavedukefan70s]

Both generals were very adept to thier fighting style.grant had access to more men .therefore used a more power approach. Were as lees extended flanking maneuvers and reinforcement speed of any weakness in his ranks was brilliant. The south had lee .but the north had several great generals. Grant,sherman ect.i do not believe with a even amount of troops the outcome would have been any different.

[77devil]

Yes, a powerful, mythic narrative.

I'm interested in, but uncertain about, why you think it impermissible to discuss the powerful hold of this myth. Do you mean impermissible on DBR because of PPB problems? Or impermissible because such a discussion with or about folks who hold to this myth quickly degenerates into name-calling and even bridge-burning?

I'm not trying to egg you on, and I've no right to be disappointed if you prefer to let your statement stand as is.

But for me, it's not impermissible to discuss the power of the myth here. Possibly I've already overstepped some bounds, but I hope not, and think not. Indeed, in my original post over on the "What are you reading?" thread, I opined that the uncomplicated explanation is that many Southerners are simply, obviously, and understandably embarrassed that somehow their forebears countenanced slavery, perhaps owned slaves. Moderns prefer to distance family histories from slavery, and need to see forebears as honorably defending their homeland from Yankee invaders, their states from federal, intrusive centralizers. Rather than dishonorably defending an inhumane institution.

At the simplest level, this "embarrassment factor" goes a good way in explaining why, as you say, "The myth of states rights as the basis for secession remains a strong narrative in southern culture."

Now, I'd be interested in "thinking aloud" with you and anyone else about myth-believing friends and family. How would they react to being told that while their distaste for slavery is altogether admirable, they must understand the straightforward, non-controversial fact that 19th-century Southerners were not embarrassed by an institution they thought "the natural condition" of black slaves. Discussing this 19th-century Southern reality isn't to excuse it, but just to acknowledge it, and so contrast it with our admirable-enough disgust at human bondage.

But ... If by "we all know why" you mean something different -- that it's less the "embarrassment factor" than something much harder, i.e., racism -- then, ok, calling out friends and family as racists is difficult almost beyond imagining.

In my experience it's the latter, although admittedly not a statistically significant sample. It is a subject likely to cross the DBR line.

[Jeffrey]

It is a subject likely to cross the DBR line.

Absolutely, discussing Robert E. Lee is much safer.

[Jeffrey]

And your statement that none of the Army of Potomac generals defeated Lee conveniently leaves out Meade, who fought Lee once in a major battle -- and crushed him at Gettysburg.

IMO, Lee defeated Lee at Gettysburg. It was his biggest mistake and the South's last realistic chance to win the war.

I stand by my statement, Lincoln defeated Lee with the Emancipation Proclamation, not the frequently rotating generals of the Army of the Potomac. If Booth had assassinated President Lincoln three years earlier, this may be a very different USA today. IMO, Lincoln was a great commander in chief.

[Jeffrey]

While we now view Antietam as a tactical draw, at the time, it was widely perceived as a Union victory because Lee withdrew from Maryland and returned to Confederate territory. He accomplished none of his goals behind the invasion -- he did not rally any significant confederate support in Maryland and he did not inspire any European nation to recognize the Confederacy. All he did was supply Lincoln with an excuse to issue the Emancipation Proclamation.

An excuse to issue? Lincoln wrote, "I made the peremptory proclamation on what appeared to me to be a military necessity."

Where we fundamentally differ is on Lee's strategic skills. IMO, Lee had the only viable strategy for winning the war. Lee's northern invasion strategy may have gotten the European sympathy and/or northern voter peace demands Lee desired. Lincoln defeated Lee with the Emancipation Proclamation, "a military necessity".

[jjasper0729]

An excuse to issue? Lincoln wrote, "I made the peremptory proclamation on what appeared to me to be a military necessity."

Where we fundamentally differ is on Lee's strategic skills. IMO, Lee had the only viable strategy for winning the war. Lee's northern invasion strategy may have gotten the European sympathy and/or northern voter peace demands Lee desired. Lincoln defeated Lee with the Emancipation Proclamation, "a military necessity".

I think that's one of the big differences, though, in how you determine strategic skill. Lee wasn't looking to "Win" the war as much as simply end it. If he could get the North to come to peace and let things be, that was fine with him. This was probably the same line of thinking that MacClellan had. Grant (and Lincoln) were more interested in winning the war.

That being said, if not for JWB, the South would have been more likely integrated back into the Union in a better manner than what happened during the post-Lincoln reconstruction.

[jimsumner]

An excuse to issue? Lincoln wrote, "I made the peremptory proclamation on what appeared to me to be a military necessity."

Where we fundamentally differ is on Lee's strategic skills. IMO, Lee had the only viable strategy for winning the war. Lee's northern invasion strategy may have gotten the European sympathy and/or northern voter peace demands Lee desired. Lincoln defeated Lee with the Emancipation Proclamation, "a military necessity".

That's one way to look at it.

But there's another way, one increasingly viewed with favor in the historical community.

Overly-simplified.

The South was never going to conquer the North. And didn't need to.

The South's best chance to win the war was to fight a completely defensive war. Take advantage of interior lines of transportation and communication, the psychological advantage of defending home turf and make the Union fight for every square inch and induce enough war weariness that favorable terms could be obtained.

There are real advantages to adopting this posture.

And not once but twice, Lee squandered these advantages by taking his superbly trained army into the North and bleeding them to no discernible advantage. As others have said, those troops in 1863 could have been a lot more valuable at Vicksburg than at Gettysburg.

No question, Lee was great at Chancellorsville, Fredericksburg and other battles. But there's a difference between strategic excellence and tactical excellence and most of the criticism of Lee focuses on the bigger question of how the Confederacy could best have won its independence.

[Jeffrey]

I think that's one of the big differences, though, in how you determine strategic skill. Lee wasn't looking to "Win" the war as much as simply end it. If he could get the North to come to peace and let things be, that was fine with him.

Absolutely, it was a war Lee never wanted.

[Jeffrey]

That's one way to look at it.

But there's another way, one increasingly viewed with favor in the historical community.

Overly-simplified.

The South was never going to conquer the North. And didn't need to.

The South's best chance to win the war was to fight a completely defensive war. Take advantage of interior lines of transportation and communication, the psychological advantage of defending home turf and make the Union fight for every square inch and induce enough war weariness that favorable terms could be obtained.

There are real advantages to adopting this posture.

Isn't that what the South did before Lee took command in June, 1862? And, where was McClellan and how strong was his army in June, 1862?

What did Lee's men call him in June, 1862 and what did the Richmond Papers say about him taking command? What did most people complain about and expect Lee would do?

Granny Lee was expected to do what you stated. McClellan was 5 miles from Richmond with a very large army. The Richmond Papers objected to his appointment saying Granny Lee would wait for the Union army to come to him. I'm not sure "a completely defensive war" strategy was best.

And not once but twice, Lee squandered these advantages by taking his superbly trained army into the North and bleeding them to no discernible advantage. As others have said, those troops in 1863 could have been a lot more valuable at Vicksburg than at Gettysburg.

No question, Lee was great at Chancellorsville, Fredericksburg and other battles. But there's a difference between strategic excellence and tactical excellence and most of the criticism of Lee focuses on the bigger question of how the Confederacy could best have won its independence.

If Lee had been tactically excellent during those two invasions, then the history books would probably say he was strategically excellent. It's rather hard for Lee to be tactically excellent, during his first invasion, when the North had his invasion plans (special order 191).

[Olympic Fan]

An excuse to issue? Lincoln wrote, "I made the peremptory proclamation on what appeared to me to be a military necessity."

Where we fundamentally differ is on Lee's strategic skills. IMO, Lee had the only viable strategy for winning the war. Lee's northern invasion strategy may have gotten the European sympathy and/or northern voter peace demands Lee desired. Lincoln defeated Lee with the Emancipation Proclamation, "a military necessity".

Convenient that you leave off the first part of the quote, explaining how Lincoln needed a victory to issue the Emancipation Proclamation and that Antietam -- and Lee's retreat back to Virginia -- was the victory that Lee needed -- hence, the "excuse" for issuing the Emancipation Proclamation. In itself, the battle of Antietam was indecisive, but Lee's failed invasion was a major confederate defeat -- and helped the Republicans in the upcoming Congressional elections.

Lee's strategy was NOT the only viable strategy for winning the war. As military professionals have repeatedly pointed out, the best and easiest strategy was to defend the Southern territory ... to fight a defensive war until the North gave up. Lee's two failed invasions -- in 1862 and 1863 -- only helped Lincoln in the long run.

And I pointed out earlier that Lee's 1862 invasion at least had some rationale behind it -- the hope that Maryland would rise up and join the Confederacy and the hope that a victory on Northern soil would convince England and France to intervene (which wasn't going to happen -- the evidence that Robert Bunch in Charleston was sending the proved that the Southern firebrands were intend on re-opening the African slave trade ... an anathema to Great Britain ... made that impossible).

But the 1863 invasion of Pennsylvania was absolutely senseless -- at that point the South knew there was no chance of European intervention and it wasn't like Pennsylvania was going to come over to the Confederacy. Yes, a major victory in Pennsylvania would have increased Union war weariness, but another Confederate victory in Virginia would have done the same. In fact, if Lee had not invaded and allowed a portion of his army to re-inforce Johnston in Tennessee, instead of losing Gettysburg and Vicksburg within days of each other -- two Union victories that went a long way towards sustaining Lincoln's drive to end the war -- there would have been one battle -- very possibly a Southern victory over Grant outside Vicksburg ... THAT would have gone a long way toward increasing Union war weariness.

Lee defeated Lee at Gettysburg.

So now we know ... Jeffrey is Ademola "only UNC can beat UNC" Okulaja.

So it looks pretty obvious to me. The outcome of the war was in serious question during the Seven Days Campaign, however by the time of the Wilderness Campaign, most people view the war as over and it's just a matter of time before the South throws in the towel.

I'm also curious that there seems to be some interesting numbers being thrown around for the Wilderness Campaign. The numbers I'm seeing from several different sources have Union casualties at around 17,000 and Confederate casualties at around 11,000. The numbers I'm seeing include killed, wounded, and captured.

I'd also like to throw this out there since some people feel casualties determine who won or lost a battle. Try these numbers on for size:
Side A: Approximately 20,000 casualties, killed, wounded, missing, and captured
Side B: Approximately 51,000 casualties, and these numbers don't include wounded or missing
Who came out ahead here?

Go back and read these threads -- I have consistently argued that casualties do NOT determine victory. The South had more men killed at Chancellorsville -- but that was a major Confederate victory. Lee had substantially more men killed in his Seven Days campaign than McClellan, yet obviously that was a Southern victory.

Grant had more men killed in his Overland Campaign (although he lost a smaller percentage of his army than Lee during the campaign) -- but he was the clear victor in the campaign because he forced Lee back into his lines around Richmond. For the entire campaign, the North suffered 54,000 casualties ... the South between 30-35,000 casualties

I think you are also wrong when you say that "most people view the war as over" by the time of the Wilderness Campaign. That's absolutely, 100 percent wrong ... most historians believe the South still had one chance to win its independence in 1864 -- the election of George McClellan to the Presidency in November. That's where war weariness might have paid off. McClellan almost certainly would have declared an armistice and negotiated a peace settlement. All Lee and the South had to do was to hold firm and continue to defend their territory.

That's why many historians believe that the morning of May 8 to be one of the decisive moments in the history of the way. James McPherson said it best in his Battle Cry of Freedom:

Both flanks had been badly bruised, and [Grant's] 17,500 casualties in two days exceeded the Confederate total by at least 7,000. Under such circumstances previous Union commanders in Virginia had withdrawn behind the nearest river. Men in the ranks expected the same thing to happen again. But Grant had told Lincoln "whatever happens, there will be no turning back."
While the armies skirmished warily on May 7, Grant prepared to march around Lee's right during the night to seize the crossroads village of Spotsylvania a dozen miles to the south. If successful, this move would place the Union army closer to Richmond than the enemy and force Lee to fight or retreat. All day Union supply wagons and the reserve artillery moved to the rear, confirming the soldiers' weary expectation of retreat. After dark the blue divisions pulled out one by one.
But instead of heading north, they turned south. A mental sunburst brightened their minds. It was not another "Chancellorsville ... another skedaddle" after all. "Our spirits rose," recalled one veteran who remembered this moment as a turning point in the war. Despite the terrors of the past three days and those to come, "we marched free. The men began to sing." For the first time in a Virginia campaign the Army of the Potomac stayed on the offensive after its initial battle.

The "Battle of Wilderness" was a Confederate victory on a par with Chancellorsville or Second Manassas ... but it was merely the first stage in the campaign that defeated Lee and ended the war. On May 8, 1864, the South could still have won the war ... by seeing McClellan elected President. When Lincoln was re-elected in March THAT was the moment when there was no hope of victory. At tat point, Southern sacrifice was futile and it Southern leaders were rational, they should have sued for peace.

BTW: Grant's Overland Campaign reminds me of my all-time favorite general and one of the most brilliant campaigns in US history -- Nathanael Greene's two-year campaign in the Carolinas. On Dec. 3, 1780, he inherited a shattered Army and was outnumbered more than six to one by the finest troops in the British Army, commanded by the best British general to fight in the American Revolution. Two years later -- after losing every battle he fought (although his subordinate Daniel Morgan did win one battle, at Cowpens) -- Greene had reconquered both Carolinas -- an area larger than France or Germany, except for the fortified fortress city of Charleston. It's one of the most remarkable campaigns in military history.

[jdk]

IMO, Lee defeated Lee at Gettysburg. It was his biggest mistake and the South's last realistic chance to win the war.

I'm not as well versed as some of you about the Civil War, but IMO, Lee was overconfident after Chancellorsville. In hindsight, his only chance of stalemate would have been fortifying Richmond and diverting troops to Vicksburg.

FWIW, my grandfather's great-grandfather fought at Chancellorsville where he sustained a leg injury. 150 years later, I walked the battlefield with my platoon. Yes, in the 21st Century, we are still taught about General Jackson's tactics.

[wavedukefan70s]

Isn't that what the South did before Lee took command in June, 1862? And, where was McClellan and how strong was his army in June, 1862?

What did Lee's men call him in June, 1862 and what did the Richmond Papers say about him taking command? What did most people complain about and expect Lee would do?

Granny Lee was expected to do what you stated. McClellan was 5 miles from Richmond with a very large army. The Richmond Papers objected to his appointment saying Granny Lee would wait for the Union army to come to him. I'm not sure "a completely defensive war" strategy was best.



If Lee had been tactically excellent during those two invasions, then the history books would probably say he was strategically excellent. It's rather hard for Lee to be tactically excellent, during his first invasion, when the North had his invasion plans (special order 191).

Didnt they fail to act on the information in time?i believe i read 18 hrs to late.