Slavery, secession, Civil War issues

[jimsumner]

If I can briefly move the discussion back to secession.


I have long cited Alexander Stephens' so-called "Cornerstone" speech as the best example of how slavery was the root cause of secession.

Stephens was the VP of the confederacy. I won't quote the entire speech--which he gave shortly before the firing on Fort Sumter. Just the highlights.

But the highlights are pretty telling.
`

"The new [Confederate] Constitution has put at rest forever all the agitating questions relating to our peculiar institutions—African slavery as it exists among us—the proper status of the negro in our form of civilization. This was the immediate cause of the late rupture and present revolution. Jefferson, in his forecast, had anticipated this, as the "rock upon which the old Union would split." He was right. What was conjecture with him, is now a realized fact. But whether he fully comprehended the great truth upon which that rock stood and stands, may be doubted. The prevailing ideas entertained by him and most of the leading statesmen at the time of the formation of the old Constitution were, that the enslavement of the African was in violation of the laws of nature; that it was wrong in principle, socially, morally and politically. It was an evil they knew not well how to deal with; but the general opinion of the men of that day was, that, somehow or other, in the order of Providence, the institution would be evanescent and pass away... Those ideas, however, were fundamentally wrong. They rested upon the assumption of the equality of races. This was an error. It was a sandy foundation, and the idea of a Government built upon it—when the "storm came and the wind blew, it fell."

"Our new government is founded upon exactly the opposite ideas; its foundations are laid, its cornerstone rests, upon the great truth that the negro is not equal to the white man; that slavery, subordination to the superior race, is his natural and normal condition. This, our new government, is the first, in the history of the world, based upon this great physical, philosophical, and moral truth. This truth has been slow in the process of its development, like all other truths in the various departments of science."

He then goes on to assert that Negro inferiority has been proven scientifically as a law of nature.

In other words, Jefferson was wrong when he wrote that all men are created equal and the failure of that idea was obvious to scientifically-minded people.

It's a fascinating look at the mindset of the planter aristocracy that somehow convinced poor, southern whites to fight for the right of that aristocracy to own other human beings.

And, yes, some of my ancestors were among those convinced. And I grew up in rural North Carolina venerating their bravery and the lost cause. But I eventually came to the realization that a Confederate victory would have been an absolute disaster.

[-jk]

It's like Donnie Darko. My grandfather grew up in south Georgia. As an impoverished young adult, he was visiting his grandfather's grave. There was an elderly black man tending it who said (as my grandfather related it), "He took care of me; I take care of him."

My grandfather also started color-blind admissions to Duke...

It's a Mad, Mad, Mad, Mad World!

-jk

[Devilwin]

On Grant and Lee. If you have 130,000 men against an army half your size, would it not stand to reason your casualty % is going to be lower, because you are shooting twice as much lead at your opponent? Even so, in just six weeks, Grant lost more in killed and wounded than Lee had men in his entire army! Grant quickly replaced his losses, while the South had used up nearly all of its available manpower, having less than one third the white population. In short, when Grant took over, Lee's army was already on the decline, so the assessment is really unfair. Grant's army was much larger, better supplied, and brimming with new confidence.
Lee's army was lacking in food and clothing, shoes, even ammunition. And Grant had the raider Sheridan attacking and burning homes and crops of innocent women and children. He also had the remorseless figure of Sherman doing in Georgia and the Carolinas what Sheridan was doing in the Shenandoah Valley. That is, making war on the helpless. Like I said before, this was brilliant, since it shortened the war, saving many lives. But in today's standards, it would be called "war crimes."
But in spite of Grant's numerous advantages, the first time he faced Lee, he was extremely lucky to draw a stalemate in the Wilderness. An aide found Grant weeping in his tent after the battle, having as he said, "quite a rough time of it."
Lee wasn't perfect. Gettysburg could have, for example, been handled better. But he was poorly served by his subordinates during the battle. Longstreet was balky and argumentative, Stuart was out of sight, and Ewell was overly cautious (probably because he was new to the command, and felt uneasy at replacing the incomparable Stonewall).
Longstreet tried to force his will on his commander, even though at first he was most likely correct on his idea of interposing the army between Meade and Washington, the situation evolved to the point where such a movement was untenable. Stuart left the army blind for several days.
Grant won the war for the north, the ultimate objective, so we give him the credit. But Lee deserves more credit he has been given here. Change places, Grant would have not made as long as Lee did, in my opinion. Looking at all the advantages Grant had when he faced Lee, it is not a fair assessment of the two commanders against each other.

[Karl Beem]

Pay little attention to the relative sizes of the armies. The two sides had different methods of counting. The North counted everybody, officers, teamsters, etc. The South just counted enlisted combat troops.

[Olympic Fan]

Armies on the attack almost always suffer heavier casualties -- at least until their opponent breaks. It doesn't matter the initial size of the attacking army.

That's true for Napoleonic warfare, Civil Warfare and WWII.

It was especially true in WWI. I'm not even going to mention the offensive failures such as the Somme, Gallipoli and such. I would point out that at Belleau Wood, five German divisions hit 2 1/2 American divisions and suffered catastrophic losses -- and those were veteran, well-led German troops against raw, untested Americans. At St. Mihiel, more than 650,000 Americans and French (mostly Americans) attacked a little more than 50,000 Germans -- and suffered twice as many killed as the defenders (although they made that up by taking the position and 16,000 casualties. At the Meuse-Argonne (the bloodiest battle in American history), 1.2 million Allies (mostly American) attacked 450,000 Germans and suffered 192,00 casualties v. 126,000 German casualties.

The same trend continued in WWII. During Operation Crusader in 1941, twice as many British suffered twice as many casualties in driving the German/Italian army back to Tunisia. Despite massive advantages in men and material, Montgomery suffered significantly more casualties in the initial assault at El Alamein (although the followup went widely in his favor). In Normandy (not the invasion, but the six weeks of hedgrerow warfare) 1.3 million allies faced 380,000 Germans, and suffered 120,000 casualties vs. 113,000 casualties.

At the Battle of the Bulge 406,000 Germans attacked a segment manned by 228,000 Americans on Dec. 16. Eight days later, we achieved numerical parity in the battle ... I don't have a day-by-day breakdown of casualties, but by Jan. 2, the Americans had inflicted over 100,000 casualties ... with losses of 89,000.

As Karl Beem mentioned, counting numbers is not always easy and different historians come up with different numbers for different battles. Not only do different armies count combatants differently, but they count casualties differently too. And I keep repeating -- you don't measure victory my counting casualties.

I know I'm not going to convince you, but the majority of military professionals and non-Southern historians believe that Grant was the superior general. The genesis of that "revisionist" history was Colonel JFC Fuller, the British officer who is the godfather of armored theory (both Guderian and Rommel admitted that they learned from his pre-war papers). Fuller's assessment: Grant was not only the greatest general of the Civil War, but the greatest general in American history (although to be fair, he was writing before WWII).

More modern historians have picked up the debate. Alan Nolan, who published Lee Reconsidered in 1991, explained the current swing in thought: "I think there was a constituency out there that was kind of fed up with the Lee myth, and once somebody started nailing it, they all came out of the woodwork," said Nolan.

Jean Edward Smith, a professor of history at Marshall University also explained it: "Lee as the exemplar of slave-owning aristocracy was romanticized by three generations of Southern historians. Grant was denigrated by this same school of historiography, which really dominated American thought through World War II."

Four books you might want to check that explode the Lee myth: "Uncertain Glory: Lee's Generalship re-examined" by John D. McKenzie, "How Robert E. Lee Lost the Civil War" by Edward H. Bonekemper III, "Robert E. Lee's Civil War" by Bevin Alexander and "Lee Moves North: Robert E. Lee on the Offensive" by Michael A. Palmer.

Recent books that celebrate Grant's accomplishments include: "President Grant Reconsidered" by Frank J. Scaturro, "Ulysses S. Grant: Soldier & President" by Geoffery Perret and "Ulysses S. Grant: Triumph Over Adversity, 1822-1865" by Brooks D. Simpson, a historian at Arizona State University who is working on a second volume.

I'm also interested in the comment by WV_Iron_Duke about fortifications during the Civil War. It's a fascinating subject. Lee, an engineer at West Point, earned the nickname "The King of Spades" during the early days of the war, when he oversaw the construction of Richmond's defenses. But when he was promoted to field commander in the spring of 1862, he rejected field fortifications, wanting to keep his troops mobile. Even situations where his men should have dig in -- at Antietem and Jackson's troops at Second Manasses (although many were partially protected by an unused railrood embankment-- didn't do so. You say that Antietem was the last major battle where fortifications were not used ... I don't think that's true. There was little use of field fortifications for most of the war (Vicksburg the big exception ... Pemberton fell back to his fortifications) -- on either side. That did change during the Overland campaign -- especially at Spotsylvania, where the Southern troops did dig in very effectively. They did that in most of the later battles of the campaign and, of course, once Lee was trapped in the very lines The Kind of Spades had prepared early in 1862.

I also suggest taking a closer look at Antietem -- Hood's charge was the worst example of throwing defending troops away for no purpose, but there were plenty more -- Harry Hays' Louisiana Tigers lost almost two thirds of its 500 men after a successful charge across the cornfield left them exposed to Union cannon. Starke threw more than 1,000 men away with another gallant, but unnecessary charge into the cornfield. One of DH Hill's five brigades attacked with Hood's 2,300 men -- both brigades were decimated. I actually think that Gregg's counterattack late in the day was warranted as the arriving troops found Burnside's forces on the verge of flanking the Confederate line. The many counterattacks in the vicinity of the cornfield were tactical madness. One wonders what the casualty count would have been if Lee had let his men dig in and use their rifles to defend the line.

The Sunken Lane offers a preview -- Hill's men weren't dug in but the sunken road provided a natural fortification. A small force of 2,500 men (late reinfornced) held the position for hours, inflicting significantly higher casualties than they suffered. The position was only overrun after a union force captured on overlooking knoll (where the defenders were not entrenched and fired in a flanking fire.

[gotoguy]

I've been listening to a civil War podcast by Richard and Tracey Youngdahl which I highly recommend. The episode I listened to today titled "rebellion thus sugar coated" discusses social and political causes of the war. The Youngdahls in their podcast reference a book written by Charles B Dew, professor of history Williams College, "The Apostles of Disunion." Prof Dew discusses commissioners of secession sent by the original deep south states that first seceded from the Union to the remaining slaves states that had not yet seceded. Their task was to convince the remaining slave states to secede. Dew, who grew up in Florida and on his 14th birthday received a .22 cal rifle and Douglas Southall Freeman's three book series "Lee's Lieutenants" from his father, concludes that slavery was the primary factor driving secession based on speeches and letters from these commissioners.

Also as Jim Summer previously referenced, Alexander Stephen's cornerstone speech pretty much sums it up at least in my mind.

[Devilwin]

Lee had many admirers among the great men of history.
Teddy Roosevelt said," He had extraordinary skill as a general, his dauntless courage and high leadership, that stood the hardest of all strains, the strain of bearing himself well through the gray evening of dismal failure, and out of that failure he helped to build the mighty triumph of our national life, in which all his countrymen, north and south share." He also said "Lee was the greatest of all the great captains the English speaking race has brought forth".

Dwight D. Eisenhower said of Lee, "Robert E Lee was one of the most supremely gifted men produced by our nation. He believed unswervingly in the constitutional validity of his cause which until 1865 was still an arguable question in America, he was a poised and inspiring leader, he was thoughtful yet demanding of his officers and men, ingenious and courageous in battle, and never disheartened by a reversal or obstacle. Through his many trials, he remained selfless almost to a fault, and unfailing in his faith to God.
Taken altogether, he was noble as a leader and a man, and unsullied as I read the pages of our history.
From deep conviction, I say this, that a nation of men of Lee's caliber would be unconquerable in spirit and soul, indeed, if present day youth would strive to emulate his rare qualities, including his devotion to this land in his efforts to bind the nation's wounds once the bitter struggle was over, we, in our own time of danger in a divided world, will be strengthened and our love of freedom sustained.
"Ike, you are my Lee, and I am your Jackson". General George S Patton, Jr.
" Lee is a phenomenon, he is the only man I would follow blindfolded". General Thomas J Jackson.
Both men had their detractors, and their friends.

[Jeffrey]

If we were picking teams, I would take Lee. IMO, the North would have won quicker if Lee had been their leader. OTOH, I think the North would have also won quicker if Grant had lead the South.

[Karl Beem]

If we were picking teams, I would take Lee. IMO, the North would have won quicker if Lee had been their leader. OTOH, I think the North would have also won quicker if Grant had lead the South.

Lee would probably have done better if he had the superior force, but Grant would have eaten him up. Grant > Lee.

[Olympic Fan]

Lee would probably have done better if he had the superior force, but Grant would have eaten him up. Grant > Lee.

Fun topic to debate. Obviously, I agree with Karl Beem ...

I do think Lee's tactics actually would have suited the North better.

The point that most professionals use to denigrate General Lee is that his tactics seem to be developed in a vacuum -- devoid of context regarding what the South needed to do to win the war.

I know and I have read Southern apologists who suggest that when the war started, the South didn't have a chance of overcoming the Northern edge in manpower and material (unless European powers intervened). That's pure revisionism -- when the war started almost nobody thought the North could win -- not the British professionals, not the French and not the Southerners themselves.

The North did have advantages in manpower and material, yes ... but the South had a HUGE strategic advantage. The North had to conquer the South. All the South had to do was not get conquered. Very few professionals in the North thought it was possible -- McClellan never did and if he had won he 1864 presidential election, he would have made peace with the South. The one professional soldier who thought it was possible was old Winfield Scott. He was a Virginian, but unlike Lee, he was loyal to the Union. He argued in the opening weeks of the war that victory was possible, but it would be a long and costly process. The younger generals at the time laughed at his Anaconda Plan, but that was the scheme the North finally used to strangle the South.

The South had another strategic advantage -- interior lines. Geography gave the South the ability to shift troops from one theater to another, MUCH faster than the North could do.

Lee, of course, threw away that advantage with his single-minded focus on the war in Virginia. The one time it was tried (over Lee's objections), in late Sugust of 1863, Longstreet's corps (decimated at Gettysburg) was shifted to Tennessee and helped smash Rosecrans Army of the Cumberland at Chickamauga. Note, that was one of the few times when the South achieved numerical superiority on the battlefield. It could have happened much more often -- in fact, Bonekemper makes a pretty convincing argument that Lee's greatest mistake of the war was his decision to invade Pennsylvania after Chancellorsville, when Pemberton was facing dire circumstances at Vicksburg. In hindsight, it's easy to see that rather than head North with no discernible strategic goal in mind, that the South should have transferred at least a corp to the West to smash Grant and relieve Pemberton and save Vicksburg.

But that's the strategic failure of General Lee.

Tactically, he was much better, EXCEPT for his aggressiveness, which resulted in a lot of very costly victories -- they were victories the South couldn't afford ... not with its disadvantage in manpower. That's why I say Lee would have been a better general for the North. His aggressive tactics would have been perfectly suited to the Northern need to conquer the South. As a Northern general, Lee could have afforded the casualties that his tactics cased.

Would Grant have fared better as a Southern general, with the limitations that Lee had to deal with?

From my reading, I believe that if he had come to power in the spring of 1862 (and had the ear and trust of Jefferson Davis, as Lee did), there's no question that he would have adopted a defensive strategy that would have frustrated Lee and the North. The man who mapped out the brilliant Vicksburg campaign almost certainly would have used the South's interior lines to achieve local superiority against the spread out Union armies.

Maybe by the late spring of 1864, when Lee and Grant did in fact begin their duel, the Northern Army was so strong and the Southern army was so far gone -- and with Sherman and Sheridan destroying the Confederate infrastructure -- that even Grant might not have been able to save it. But I'm not sure -- the other advantage that Grant had over Lee (besides his far superior strategic sense) was his command of the battlefield. Several Lee defenders have pointed out how he was often let down by his subordinate commanders. Could that have been because Lee had a small staff, often issued vaguely worded orders and rarely did anything to enforce his orders to his subordinates? Grant was sometimes let down by his subordinates too, but not nearly as often as he maintained a far better control of the battlefield.

Still, a fun topic to debate ...

[86devils]

I am so far out of my depth in this thread that I feel like a little kid watching the grownups discuss the matters of the world, but I have learned a lot in reading through it. My issue/question is not directly on point but this certainly seemed like the best thread to post it. Forgive me if this is nit-picky, but it's been on my mind.

Toward the end of J.D. King's post about the future of ACC television/streaming/whatever, he mentions Lt. Gen. Nathan Bedford Forrest in reference, essentially, to first-mover advantage, which seemed relevant given his reputation as an innovative cavalry officer. At the very end of his post, King comes back around to mention Forrest, noting his rare (but not unique) rise from an enlisted private to a general officer despite a lack of formal education. OK, interesting trivia point to know. But I wonder if leaving it at that - not mentioning Forrest's other "claim to fame" as the first grand wizard of the KKK - is sufficient.

Forrest's legacy is a complicated one. He was hailed as a hero of the confederacy for his battlefield victories as well as for his advocacy of southern states after the war. He was a very successful businessman who wielded considerable influence during the reconstruction. But he was also known for alleged war atrocities and for his aforementioned role in Klan. He later distanced himself from the Klan, though apparently for business reasons rather than philosophical ones. He was quoted as saying his sympathies lay with the Klan despite his lack of formal association with them. There are conflicting accounts of his involvement in the terror campaigns and murders meant to dissuade black citizens from exercising their newly gained voting rights and freedoms. And in his last public speech Forrest spoke about the need for reconciliation between the races, for which he was roundly criticized by his one-time friends & supporters. So, yeah, complicated.

As a liberal white southerner - complete with the matching set of guilt-laden baggage - I can't help but think omitting that context is problematic. I try really hard to NOT fall victim to pointless political correctness because I know it infuriates many people and tends to stymie our conversations, distracting us from the substantive issues. But is this just PC BS or is it worth noting? Many, many southerners know the name Nathan Bedford Forrest and almost all of them associate his name with the Klan. I guess my concern is that without including mention of that context, some readers may interpret King's comments as being supportive of Forrest's well known sympathies. Or at least as naive disinterest. Another era, another election, I might not be so sensitive to this, but given how volatile race relations are at the moment I seem to notice every little potential cause for more rancor.

I realize I may be over-thinking this, possibly by an order of magnitude. I've been home sick for several days and I'm kinda starved for intellectual discussion. If I'm way off on this, please let me down gently.

[Jeffrey]

Bonekemper makes a pretty convincing argument that Lee's greatest mistake of the war was his decision to invade Pennsylvania after Chancellorsville, when Pemberton was facing dire circumstances at Vicksburg. In hindsight, it's easy to see that rather than head North with no discernible strategic goal in mind, that the South should have transferred at least a corp to the West to smash Grant and relieve Pemberton and save Vicksburg.

I strongly agree, invading Pennsylvania and losing at Gettysburg became Lee's biggest mistake. However, I disagree there was "no discernible strategic goal in mind". Didn't Lee sell Jefferson Davis on the invasion idea based on Lee's belief that a major Southern victory, deep in Northern territory, would cause many Northerners to demand peace? If Lee had been healthy, still had Stonewall, and Stuart was were he was most needed, it might have happened.

[Olympic Fan]

I strongly agree, invading Pennsylvania and losing at Gettysburg became Lee's biggest mistake. However, I disagree there was "no discernible strategic goal in mind". Didn't Lee sell Jefferson Davis on the invasion idea based on Lee's belief that a major Southern victory, deep in Northern territory, would cause many Northerners to demand peace? If Lee had been healthy, still had Stonewall, and Stuart was were he was most needed, it might have happened.

That was his argument ... but even a victory at Gettysburg would have been offset by the fall of Vicksburg, which opened up the Mississippi to the Union and divided the Confederacy in half. It would have hurt Northern morale much greater to have Lee rest on the defensive after his victory at Chaancellorsville and have Grant's army beaten outside Vicksburg.

In addition, a win at Gettysburg, unless it resulted in the destruction of the Union Army (unlikely -- no Southern army at any place ever came close to that kind of victory), the campaign would have resulted in a Southern withdrawal back to its own territory at some point. And that would have been perceived as a "failure" no matter how Lee tried to spin it.

But the idea of causing Northerners to demand peace was certainly a viable goal for the South. Lee's invasion of Maryland in September of 1862, along with the western invasion of Kentucky by Bragg and Kirby Smith was designed to inflict a morale-crushing defeat on the Union just before the 1862 congressional elections. There was also still the hope at that point that England and France would come into the war with a Southern victory in Northern territory, plus the hope that Southern success could bring the border states of Maryland and Kentucky to the Southern side.

Of course, that plan failed when both Confederate armies were beaten or I should say, failed to win a victory (in very indecisive battles at Antietam and Perryville). But at least that plan made sense.

Lee's 1863 invasion was far less sensible . By that time, it was clear that neither Britain or France were going to recognize a slaveocracy (not after the Emancipation Proclamation) and the border states weren't wavering. And embarrassing Lincoln in the summer of 1983 wouldn't have had any immediate impact on his control of the government or his determination to pursue the war. What, was the Republican Congress -- much more abolitionist that Lincoln -- going to impeach him or cut off funds for the war?

The last hope along those lines for the South was the 1864 presidential election. If McClellan had won, the North would have made peace. There was a moment in the summer of 1864, when Grant and Lee were locked in their costly battle, when McClellan might have had a chance. But Grant's overall strategy paid off as Sherman captured Atlanta and Sheridan cleared out the Shenandoah. The strong of victories in the West, along with Lee's withdrawal into his defensive lines around Richmond, sent the signal that the North was winning. Lincoln won a comfortable victory -- made more comfortable by the overwhelming solider vote in his favor. If the South was rational, they should have surrendered the day after the 1984 re-election of Lincoln. From that point, there was no chance of victory.

PS As for Forrest, he is a difficult historical character to deal with. On one hand, he was a brilliant commander -- great combat instincts and an innovative approach to cavalry tactics (basically, he realized that with modern weapons, the old cavalry battle tactics were obsolete. He converted his riders to "mounted infantry"). At the same time, Forrest is the worst example of the racist Southern "gentleman" -- a large part of his prewar fortune was made as a slave trader. For all his success as a cavalry commander, he was also a butcher at Ft. Pillow, where hundreds of black soldiers were killed after their surrender. After the war, Forrest mounted a spirited and convoluted explanation for the slaughter -- an explanation refuted by Union survivors and by a famous letter written by one of Forrest's troopers:

The slaughter was awful. Words cannot describe the scene. The poor, deluded, negroes would run up to our men, fall upon their knees, and with uplifted hands scream for mercy, but they were ordered to their feet and then shot down. I, with several others, tried to stop the butchery, and at one time had partially succeeded, but General Forrest ordered them shot down like dogs and the carnage continued. Finally our men became sick of blood and the firing ceased.

Forrest .. a great general, but a very despicable human being.

[Jeffrey]

In addition, a win at Gettysburg, unless it resulted in the destruction of the Union Army (unlikely -- no Southern army at any place ever came close to that kind of victory), the campaign would have resulted in a Southern withdrawal back to its own territory at some point. And that would have been perceived as a "failure" no matter how Lee tried to spin it.

How well would have D.C. been protected when Lee was heading home from a win at Gettysburg?

[Devilwin]

Had Lee interposed himself between Meade and Washington, Meade would have had the unenviable task of attacking entrenched southern infantry. There was no other recourse. He most likely would have wrecked his army in the process, and the Yankee capital would have been Lee's for the taking.
In 1864, Lee dispatched General Jubal Early with 10,000 men to attack Washington as a feint to relieve pressure. Early got to the outskirts of the city, and began exchanging shots with militia and wounded soldiers and clerks. No such hasty assemblage was going to bar the way for the fierce veterans of the Army of Northern Virginia. Only the timely arrival of the Sixth Corps saved the city. Early, now finding himself outnumbered two to one, withdrew.

After Lee's death, Grant finished his memoirs. In it, he rated General Lee as "an average general".
That's nothing but Grant trying to defame a man that fought so long, so bravely, and so well. Also convenient it came to light after Lee had passed..
After all, Winfield Scott had offered Lee command of the Union army.
Lee did much to reconcile his men after the war, urging them to be good citizens, get an education, and obey local authority.

I keep hearing the term "Southern Apologists." Who are these people? The war was over in 1865. The defeated south went through a terrible reconstruction.
Sherman and Sheridan wreaked havoc during 1864-65, and many southern civilians died, including women and children. Their food stolen, homes burnt, daughters raped, and other atrocities too numerous to mention.
What Forrest's men did at Fort Pillow was horrible. There was no need for that at all. It was possibly the most brutal event of the war.
But Sherman and Sheridan were no angels either, and I rank them on the same low level as Forrest.
Forrest's men murdered brave fighting men like dogs, to be sure. But Sherman and Sheridan destroyed the lives of thousands of noncombatants, so which is worse?

We've all heard of the notorious prison at Andersonville Georgia for captured Union soldiers. Grant wanted to end the exchange of prisoners, so the prison quickly became an overcrowded pit. Men lay in scanty makeshift shelters or on bare ground, and many died of disease and starvation.
We've all heard of Andersonville. In fact, the John Wayne movie, "The Horse Soldiers," mentions it seven times.
But there were Union prisons just as bad, such as Elmira, New York, where thousands of southern captives starved or froze to death. But one never hears of that one, do they.

The victors always write the history..
Even if it is resplendent with half truths and outright lies.
I have said before I am glad we are rid of the specter of human bondage, the most evil of institutions.
But I am a proud southerner, and as such, I see no reason to apologize to anyone for anything. But that's what they want us to do. Get rid of anything that echoes the American Southland of the antebellum past. The trials and tribulations our ancestors went through took generations to soothe.

[Bob Green]

Had Lee interposed himself between Meade and Washington, Meade would have had the unenviable task of attacking entrenched southern infantry. There was no other recourse. He most likely would have wrecked his army in the process, and the Yankee capital would have been Lee's for the taking.

In other words, Lee should have listened to Longstreet. From They Met at Gettysburg by General Edward J. Stackpole:

...Longstreet pressed his argument that the thing to do was to move around Meade's left flank, place Lee's army between Meade and Washington, and duplicate Fredericksburg by forcing Meade to attack.

In regard to Olympic Fan's earlier comments on shifting troops to the west to relieve Vicksburg:

Longstreet was opposed to the invasion in the first place, believing that the cause of the Confederacy would be better served by reinforcing the western armies, under the direct command of Lee, with the object of defeating Grant and relieving Vicksburg. When those views were rejected, he had urged Lee to adhere to the strategic defensive in the course of his marh into Pennsylvania, and, recalling Fredericksburg, to lure the Army of the Potomac into another attack against a position of Lee's own choosing, and thus allow Hooker, then in command of the union army, to shatter it in a repeat performance.

The discussions in this thread are enjoyable to read. It is these type discussions which make DBR such a unique internet site. I am appreciative of the book recommendations made in the thread. While I've limited my participation to reading prior to this post, now that I've chimed in there are two points I wish to communicate my agreement with:

1. Secession and the Civil War were about slavery.
2. Invading Pennsylvania and being thumped by Meade at Gettysburg was Lee's greatest mistake.

[Olympic Fan]

How well would have D.C. been protected when Lee was heading home from a win at Gettysburg?

Fair question ... but Washington, DC was the most heavily fortified city in the world by 1863. Lee would have had to undertake massive (and slow) siege operations to penetrate the chain on interlocking forts surrounding the city. He couldn't have even thought at about doing that with the Army of the Potomac still functioning -- even after a defeat. Look how quickly the army bounced back after its defeat at Chancellorsville (or earlier, after Second Manassas).

Devilwin:
Had Lee interposed himself between Meade and Washington, Meade would have had the unenviable task of attacking entrenched southern infantry. There was no other recourse. He most likely would have wrecked his army in the process, and the Yankee capital would have been Lee's for the taking.

Well, I'm glad to see that you've come around to Longstreet's point of view and recognized Lee's strategic idiocy at Gettysburg. That's EXACTLY the strategy that Longstreet proposed and Lee rejected.

Now, if you mean that after winning a tactical victory at Gettysburg, Lee then adopts Longstreet's strategy, I very much doubt that a beaten union army goes on the attack. Instead, they merely assume positions opposite Lee and let him starve between their lines and the fortifications of Washington. Or he has to go on the attack again in one direction or another. If he does that before Gettysburg, then I agree the union army has to attack ... but Lee wasn't smart enough to see that.

As for Early's 1864 "raid" -- because that's what it was -- why do you think the Sixth Corps was able to arrive in time? Yes, Early brushed aside the militia in his path, but when he got to the fortifications, he could go no further. He was stopped cold by the defenders of Fort Stevens. The Washington's fortifications, laid out by McClellan in 1861, covered 33 miles with 16 forts located on high ground and with 88 field guns arrayed in protected positions between the forts. They were much stronger than the Confederate fortifications around Richmond, which took Grant's victorious army eight months to crack.

As for the prisoner exchange, it's true that Grant wanted to stop it -- knowing that the union had a distinct manpower advantage, while the South was running low on troops. But he couldn't get the government to approve the end of exchanges until 1864, when the South refused to exchange black soldiers ... or even treat them like prisoners of war. Instead, they were forced into slavery. That outrage finally convinced the Union government to halt all exchanges.

As for the Southern apologists, those are the ex-confederates who went to work right after the war to re-write history ... One example, was Stephens, who tried to back away from his Cornerstone speech and build the case that the war wasn't about slavery. It continued with Early and Pemberton, who provided much of the documentary evidence about the battles of the war -- much of it faked. Their work did shape Civil war history for almost a century -- with just a few dissents (Fuller, Catton for two).

It continues to this day -- the Texas Board of Education -- which has a tremendous impact on the textbooks sold nationally -- has tried to whitewash the war, downplaying the role of slavery, and diminishing the role of Lincoln:

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opini...593_story.html

I saw it first hand when I was the secretary/editor of the North Carolina Military Historical Society.

The entire glorification of Robert E. Lee and the denigration of U.S. Grant in the popular culture -- in the face of modern military scholarship -- is more evidence of those "apologists".

[Jeffrey]

Fair question ... but Washington, DC was the most heavily fortified city in the world by 1863. Lee would have had to undertake massive (and slow) siege operations to penetrate the chain on interlocking forts surrounding the city. He couldn't have even thought at about doing that with the Army of the Potomac still functioning -- even after a defeat. Look how quickly the army bounced back after its defeat at Chancellorsville (or earlier, after Second Manassas).

No doubt, Lee does not ride in and take D.C. I was addressing your point:

In addition, a win at Gettysburg, unless it resulted in the destruction of the Union Army (unlikely -- no Southern army at any place ever came close to that kind of victory), the campaign would have resulted in a Southern withdrawal back to its own territory at some point. And that would have been perceived as a "failure" no matter how Lee tried to spin it.

and, wondering if a big win at Gettysburg and a quick attack on D.C., on his way back to Virginia, "would have been perceived as a "failure" no matter how Lee tried to spin it"? I'm wondering if that technique would have been considered a successful strategy as opposed to a retreat?

[Devilwin]

This is the same Lincoln that told Douglass that the freed slaves and white people could never coexist? The same man that wanted to colonize them in Haiti or Liberia?
Lincoln was not perfect either. Lincoln wanted to save the Union, period.
He said he would free the slaves and save the Union if he could, but if he couldn't free the slaves he would rather save the Union. That Lincoln detested slavery is a fact, writing about it as early as 1850.
This all started as a denigration of the abilities of Robert E Lee. A man that faced the longest odds any American general ever faced, yet in his brilliance won battle after battle against several Union commanders. Sure, many of his wins were costly ( as were Grant's) but it's easy to sit here 150 years later and second guess his abilities.
To me, Grant was a straight ahead brawler, that had enormous resources and manpower to throw into the grinder. He did, however know eventually Lee's smaller army would be worn down, and therein lies his brilliance. There is no reason to say if Lee had the same resources he would have won, it's all moot. But I believe it fervently.
His audacity was amazing, he took great risks, and usually won the day. Therein lies his brilliance. After Stonewall died, and Stuart, Lee basically held the army together alone. His men worshiped him, and would do anything he asked of them. He was the force behind the fierce men that charged the Union army on many fields in this unequal contest. And usually, he came out victorious.
It has become the latter day style to throw doubt on anything related to Southern heritage, and where better to start than "Marse Robert?"

[Olympic Fan]

This is the same Lincoln that told Douglass that the freed slaves and white people could never coexist? The same man that wanted to colonize them in Haiti or Liberia?
Lincoln was not perfect either. Lincoln wanted to save the Union, period.
He said he would free the slaves and save the Union if he could, but if he couldn't free the slaves he would rather save the Union. That Lincoln detested slavery is a fact, writing about it as early as 1850. ?"

First off, I love the debate and hope nobody is getting upset about it.

Second, nobody ever said Lincoln was perfect ... but to selectively quote a politician to warp his record is wrong.

I'm not sure of your point. You are right, Lincoln voiced his moral opposition to slavery as early as 1854, when he denounced the Kansas-Nebraska Act as a law "assuming that men had the moral right to own other men. I hate it because of the monstrous injustice of slavery itself."

Actually, his views predated that. His opposition to slavery was embedded in his youth -- as a youth he belonged to the separatist Baptist church that opposed slavery. He later wrote his friend Joshua Speed about a riverboat trip to New Orleans where he got his first closeup look at slavery and how disgusted he was by it.

His entire political career was as an opponent to slavery -- he called himself an abolitionist at heart, but said that absolute abolition would bring about a civil war, so he merely fought to oppose the spread of slavery to the territories. As a congressman, Lincoln co-authored a bill to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia. The debate was altered by the Dred Scott decision, in which Taney's court ruled that the government had no right under the constitution to limit slavery (so much for state rights) or to grant any kind of citizenship to blacks. I thought Lincoln answered that ruling masterfully with his Cooper Union Speech. when he masterly proved that a great majority of the signers of the constitution HAD voted at one time or another to limit slavery in the territories (exploding Taney's "original intent" argument).

I'm not sure what quote you are referring to from the Lincoln-Douglas debates, but I don't recall Lincoln ever saying the two races could not coexist. He did say during the debates that he did not claim that the two races were equal -- except in the right to eat the bread that each had earned. He did support the "repatriation movement" for a time, but eventually decided that was impractical when his allies, such as Frederick Douglass convinced him that most backs were opposed to the idea.

There are several goods books about the Lincoln-Douglas debates that put the issues into context.

When you get to the presidency, it's true that Lincoln was hammered for not being quick enough to attack slavery. But you have to understand, he was fighting to keep the four border states in the union, trying to get them to accept a form of compensated emancipation. It was well into the war when he issued the Emancipation Proclamation as an emergency war measure (a way around the requirement that he obtain the consent of congress).

You kind of misquote his letter to Horace Greeley. But he was stating his priorities and it made saving the union his first priority.

As to the policy I "seem to be pursuing" as you say, I have not meant to leave any one in doubt.

I would save the Union. I would save it the shortest way under the Constitution. The sooner the national authority can be restored; the nearer the Union will be "the Union as it was." If there be those who would not save the Union, unless they could at the same time save slavery, I do not agree with them. If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time destroy slavery, I do not agree with them. My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union, and is not either to save or to destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slave I would do it, and if I could save it by freeing all the slaves I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone I would also do that. What I do about slavery, and the colored race, I do because I believe it helps to save the Union; and what I forbear, I forbear because I do not believe it would help to save the Union. I shall do less whenever I shall believe what I am doing hurts the cause, and I shall do more whenever I shall believe doing more will help the cause. I shall try to correct errors when shown to be errors; and I shall adopt new views so fast as they shall appear to be true views.

I have here stated my purpose according to my view of official duty; and I intend no modification of my oft-expressed personal wish that all men every where could be free.

I'm not sure what the gripe with Lincoln is ... he was an abolitionist who believed that slavery had to be eradicated under the constitution. He believed that saving the union was his primary duty and that his personal beliefs, including his opposition to slavery were secondary to that main concern.

In the end, he did manage to save the union AND eradicate slavery. I don't know about you, but to me that's pretty impressive.

This all started as a denigration of the abilities of Robert E Lee. A man that faced the longest odds any American general ever faced, yet in his brilliance won battle after battle against several Union commanders. Sure, many of his wins were costly ( as were Grant's) but it's easy to sit here 150 years later and second guess his abilities.
To me, Grant was a straight ahead brawler, that had enormous resources and manpower to throw into the grinder. He did, however know eventually Lee's smaller army would be worn down, and therein lies his brilliance. There is no reason to say if Lee had the same resources he would have won, it's all moot. But I believe it fervently.
His audacity was amazing, he took great risks, and usually won the day. Therein lies his brilliance. After Stonewall died, and Stuart, Lee basically held the army together alone. His men worshiped him, and would do anything he asked of them. He was the force behind the fierce men that charged the Union army on many fields in this unequal contest. And usually, he came out victorious.
It has become the latter day style to throw doubt on anything related to Southern heritage, and where better to start than "Marse Robert?"

First, Robert E. Lee was never an "American" general -- he was a confederate general. His highest American rank was colonel. He also betrayed the oath he took upon graduation from West Point and his commissioning in the United States Army:

"I,_______, do solemnly swear or affirm (as the case may be) to bear true allegiance to the United States of America, and to serve them honestly and faithfully, against all their enemies or opposers whatsoever, and to observe and obey the orders of the President of the United States of America, and the orders of the officers appointed over me."

As to whether he faced the greatest odds any "American" general ever faced, I'd refer you to General Washington, who faced far steeper odds. The difference between Washington and Lee is that Washington was less concerned with winning victories as he was with the winning war. He had a strategic sense that Lee never had -- knowing when and where to risk his tiny, fragile army.

As for your view that Grant was a straight-ahead brawler, you are simply mistaken. Try and read a book about the Vicksburg campaign ... or go back and look at what Grant did in the first weeks of the war, when as a relatively junior general, he saw the strategic benefit of using the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers to invade Tennessee and quickly seized control of those vital waterways. Even in the Overland Campaign, he was no straight-ahead brawler ... instead he launched flank attack after flank attack, gradually moving Lee East and South until he had to withdraw into his fortifications.

Lee was beloved by his troops. Too bad he threw so many of them away. He may have been a great and kind and even honorable man (although his betrayal of his oath makes me wonder). That doesn't make him a great general.

I hope I can make this clear -- saying Lee wasn't the great general his admirers like to believe he was doesn't mean that I'm arguing that he was a bad general. He wasn't -- he led his men well and displayed considerable tactical genius. But he was a strategic failure who wasted his tactical gifts, piling up victories that look good in hindsight, but never led anywhere. The contrast with Grant is striking -- Grant always knew what he was doing and what he was fighting to achieve. Yes, he made mistakes too -- he was surprised at Shiloh (but used his battlefield savvy to turn his initial defeat into a crushing victory), he got impatient outside Vicksburg and Cold Harbor, ordering charges that failed. But he won far more often than Lee and he did it while losing a smaller percentage of his men.

As JFC Fuller said, US Grant was the greatest general in American history.

PS I'm sorry that you think the re-evaluation of Lee has anything to do with trashing Southern heritage. If you mean trashing the heritage of the pre-civil war South -- the Myth of the Gone With the Wind South, then trash away ... I'll lead the way. But I am a Southern born and bred and know we have a lot to be proud of -- from the role our Southern troops played in the Revolutionary War, to our literature to the courage of the men who fought to defend this country (as opposed to those who fought to destroy it) in the 20th Century.

Merely suggesting that US Grant was a greater general that Robert E. Lee is not trashing Southern heritage.