Slavery, secession, Civil War issues

[gumbomoop]

[So as not to further divert the "What are you reading" thread, I import the following post by BLPOG, and now my reply. Those uninterested in the topic of slavery, secession, Lincoln, antislavery, and war can thus be spared any additional thread hijack irritation.]

Like Olympic Fan, I want to be careful not to derail the thread here, but I would make a couple comments about these two bits of your [B]post.

First, I think you are being uncharitable to Southerners. "A little embarrassed"? "Reluctantly...aware they're supposed to be embarrassed by [slavery]?" Come on.

Second, your distinction about reasons and justifications is correct, but I think you might be ignoring the fact that it's possible to have more than one reason for doing things. When you say slavery was the reason to secede, I wonder if you are taking that as the conclusion of reading on the topic or as the reason explicitly given in the various articles of secession. Those were somewhat varied and although several mentioned slavery, other reasons were explicitly mentioned as well. It would also be a naive analysis to exclude unmentioned reasons that were part of the realpolitik - North Carolina, for instance, seceded last and was surrounded by other secessionist states. That undoubtedly played a factor in the state's decision. Moreover, as you make a distinction about reasons and justification, one must also make a distinction between secession and war.

That point about how immediately Lincoln/Republicans threatened slavery is an interesting one. Aside from Lincoln's endorsement of the Corwin amendment, there is also evidence that much of the anti-slavery movement of the time was not abolitionist per se, but actually aimed at preserving a white electorate in the expanding western states without shared interest with the South. This point is important because it adds some nuance that could (I'm not making the argument that it does; that discussion would be far too complex to have here and I don't know the answer anyway) bridge the gap between the two positions you outlined in your post. It would mean that slavery was the reason for secession, but not necessarily or exclusively protection of Southern slavery; it served as a proxy for Southern interests which it secured (via political mechanism, not in any economic sense which is an economically ignorant view).

[1] Thanks, genuinely, for your very perceptive response. I suppose my being uncharitable to Southrners might depend on which Southerners we're talking about. My scare-quote phrase, people who think of themselves as "real Southerners," refers to a vocal, yet still large, subset, those who insist that the Civil War ""wasn't really about slavery." Having lived in the South most of my life, I have heard and read this and similar sentiments expressed over and over, often enough accompanied by a comment such as this: "And anyway, slavery wasn't always horrible, either. People don't understand. Look at all those slaves who stayed loyal to their masters during the war."

While you're right that most white Southerners today would, yes definitely, say slavery was a disgrace, they don't want to dwell on the subject. They prefer to move on, reluctant, yes, to dig into the complexities of Southern history. As a result, most native white Southerners are amenable enough to the myth that the war "wasn't really about slavery." Admittedly we'd have to summon up lots of polling data to draw even tentative conclusions about contemporary white Southern attitudes toward and understanding of historical slavery, so to a large extent our respective views depend on our personal experiences, trying to make sense of those different experiences, drawing different conclusions.

At any rate, I applaud and accept the challenge of your "Come on," but say I do not recant. You might still persuade me, or I you, but neither is likely.

-------------------

On your several other points, I think we mostly agree. I'll elaborate, and maybe you'll say more in response. And others might join in. Fascinating set of topics.

[2] I agree that states gave more than one reason for seceding. But protection of slavery was a constant, in their official public declarations of secession, and numerous public elaborations over the winter of 1860-61. I agree, too, that different states were more and less enthusiastic about seceding. After all, what we may call the "first secession movement" included but 7 of the total of 15 slave states. After Sumter, 4 additional states, call them the "border South," including North Carolina and Virginia, also seceded. And as I noted in my original post, many planters opposed secession ... but precisely because they feared that slavery would be endangered in the chaos of war. They turned out to be prophetic.

[3] I agree that we must distinguish between secession and war, and think I did so in the last paragraph of my post.

[4] I agree that Republican antislavery, as of 1861 (and for roughly 2 years into the war), was distinct from abolitionism. Most important, mainstream antislavery focused, as you note, on the western territories and the doctrine of "free soil" [keeping slavery from expanding west], whereas abolitionists advocated "immediatism," ending slavery as quickly as possible where it already existed, the South. As I said in my post, secessionists mistook Republican, and especially Lincoln's, antislavery for abolitionism. What would have happened had Southern leaders, for example, listened carefully to Lincoln, who always, always, spoke very carefully, precisely, sometimes with mathematical logic? We'll never know. All we know is, if things had been different, things would have been different; but we don't know how and in what particulars different. A few Southerners did listen, and counseled patience, wait-and-see. But panic set in.

This last topic - the differences between antislavery and abolition - is indeed a complex issue, though one that historians have written about frequently and with clarity. We may say they have followed Lincoln's good example. Unfortunately it's nevertheless a distinction that is as little understood by most Americans today as it was by secessionists in 1861.

Equally complicated - complex to many levels - are topics such as (1) Lincoln's evolving views on slavery and race, and (2) the slave-master relationship in plantation slavery, small farm slavery, etc. Not to mention several hundred other related topics...

[BLPOG]

Your whole post was excellent, but I especially liked this portion:

Equally complicated - complex to many levels - are topics such as (1) Lincoln's evolving views on slavery and race, and (2) the slave-master relationship in plantation slavery, small farm slavery, etc. Not to mention several hundred other related topics...

That's a point that people frequently seem to forget. Discussions of Civil War topics are complex, yet often seem dominated by political tribalism or the assumption of tribalism and it makes it maddeningly difficult to proceed at times. It's entirely possible to sometimes disagree without either partner in a discussion being ignorant or in any way nefarious.

In any event, regarding the "real Southerners" item - your explanation has satisfied me. I tend to be uncomfortable with ascribing characterizations to large groups of people. Depending the on interpretation, your comment could be seen as very rude by some in that group, who might also be active members of this forum. Part of the issue might be how granular a term "real Southerners" is. I suspect that even if we use it as a term for people who would describe themselves as such, we (or others) would have a different expectation of the composition of that group. As a thought experiment though, consider if you were to ask those people (who describe themselves as such) if the category is predicated on opinions of Civil War-era events? My guess is that most would not think so, or would not volunteer it as part of their definition, and as such the group could easily be broad enough to include a multitude of opinions.

I'm not sure I have the time for an in-depth historical discussion (today at least), but from your post it seems like you are someone with whom I could do so quite enjoyably. I do caution about broad characterizations of potential forum members, though.

[Olympic Fan]

Ah, now to weigh in without feeling guilty.

I also grew in the South, having to deal with the idiotic revisionism -- the war wasn't about slavery ... slavery wasn't so bad and most slaves were happy in their bondage ... I was the editor of the Journal of the North Carolina Military Historical Society for a brief while, but had to give it up rather than deal with a deluge of that nonsense.

Before the Bonekemper book, I've always dealt with the issue by referring to the various state articles of secession, which quite clearly explain the motives for leaving the Union. In every case, it's all about slavery and the North's intolerable interference with slavery. I also like to reference a letter than John C. Calhoun wrote at the end of the Nullification Crisis in 1832, when he explained that the South lost that fight -- with Southerner and slave owner Andy Jackson -- because it was impossible to defend slavery publically. Instead, he argued, the South had to come up with a different argument as a smoke screen ... and he suggested "State's Rights" as a cover.

As for Lincoln's "evolving" view of slavery, I contend after much reading that he was always personally strongly opposed to slavery, viewing it as a moral crime. But he was also a practical politician whose primary goal was preservation of the Union. That primacy led him to walk a tightrope early in his first term.

Even his election -- for all the Southern view of him as a "Black Republican" and an abolitionist, he won the nomination as a moderate over the far more radical William Seward. Lincoln, during his campaign, gave assurance after assurance that he would not interfere with slavery where it existed. He did oppose expansion of slavery in the territories and (one point that really enflamed the South) he was not strong on Fugitive Slave laws.

Here's an aside that's an important nuance. A very big part of the important slavery compromises in the 19th Century were the enactment of Federal Fugitive Slave Laws -- slaves who escaped to the North must be returned to their owners in the South (and the flood of fugitives is pretty rebuttal to the claim that slaves were happy in their bondage). But many in the North opposed such laws and various states passed so-called "Liberty Laws" that blocked federal enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Laws.

Southern respect for "State Rights" didn't extend to giving Northern states "State Rights" in that area.

In the period between Lincoln's election and his inauguration, several politicians fought for compromises to save the Union. Lincoln let it be known that he would support measures to reassure the South about the protection of the slaves they held -- even a constitutional amendment forbidding the government from interfering with slavery in the states where it existed. But that's as far as he would go and that wasn't far enough for the firebrands in the South.

One of the greatest points that Bonekemper makes in his book, is to point out the demographics of the Southern states and how it relates to secession.

The seven states that seceded before Lincoln's inauguration had the seven highest slave population (by percentage) in the South. An average of 47 percent of the population of those seven states were slaves ... and an average of 37 percent of the white families owned slaves.

The four states that seceded after Fort Sumter were the next in line as far as slave populations -- 29 percent slave population and 25 percent of families owned slaves.

The four "border" states that stayed in the Union averaged 14 percent slave population and 16 percent of families owned slaves.

I think that's pretty clear evidence of how slavery was driving the move to secession.

As for Lincoln's evolving policies, he spent the first year or so of his presidency fighting to keep the border states in the Union. When General Fremont freed all the slaves in Missouri, Lincoln overruled him -- not to protect slavery, but to keep Missouri in the Union. He worked his butt off to conceive a plan of gradual emancipation in those states (to be compensated by the federal government). He finally allowed his generals in the South to accept black runaways into their lines, accepting them as "contraband". When he finally issued the Emancipation Proclamation in the fall of 1862, he labeled it an emergency war action -- the proclamation itself merely said that on Jan. 1, 1983 all slaves in the area of rebellion would be freed ... he left the border states to come up with their own emancipation.

One skeptic pointed out that in the Emancipation Proclamation "Lincoln freed the slaves in places where he had no power to ... he refused to free the slaves in the paces where he had the power to do so." A fair assessment, although in the long run, the emergency war measure turned out to be a brilliant tactical maneuver.

One other interesting point that, as an enthusiastic amateur military historian, I especially like. After the Battle of Waterloo in 1815, the first British historian of the battle actually took money from various unit commanders to glorify the roles their units played in the battle. Units not offering a payoff (such as the Dutch-Belgium troops in Wellington's army) saw their roles denigrated. His mercenary research has warped accounts of the Battle of Waterloo for more than a Century and a half.

Something similar happened after the Civil War as the defeated Southern generals (especially Early and Pemberton) began to put together memoirs and accounts of the various battles. Not so much for money -- although that did occur -- but mostly for political reasons. Their main goal was to glorify Robert E. Lee and cover up or minimize his mistakes (of which there were many). The chief fall guy became James Longstreet, who after the war became a Republican. Early accounts of the battle of Gettysburg shift the blame for the Confederate disaster from the sainted Lee to the hated Longstreet ... even though it was Longstreet who argued strenuously with Lee over launching massive frontal assaults on the Union lines. He was right in every instance and Lee wrong ... yet for more than a century, the accepted line was the Longstreet "lost" Gettysburg for Lee.

As a result, the often-inept Lee has been glorified as one of the greatest commanders in history. Military professonals know better -- starting with JFC Fuller in the 1930s, who wrote a book Grant and Lee setting the record straight -- the great commander from the Civil War was US Grant, not Robert E. Lee. And it's not even close.

Again, the post-war conspiracy to warp the record has been to label Grant as a butcher, who bludgeoned the gallant Lee to destruction. In fact, Grant's troops suffered a significantly lower loss rate during the war than Lee's troops. He also won -- accepting the surrender of three different Confederate armies -- including Lee's.

[gumbomoop]

... regarding the "real Southerners" item - your explanation has satisfied me. I tend to be uncomfortable with ascribing characterizations to large groups of people. Depending the on interpretation, your comment could be seen as very rude by some in that group, who might also be active members of this forum. Part of the issue might be how granular a term "real Southerners" is. I suspect that even if we use it as a term for people who would describe themselves as such, we (or others) would have a different expectation of the composition of that group. As a thought experiment though, consider if you were to ask those people (who describe themselves as such) if the category is predicated on opinions of Civil War-era events? My guess is that most would not think so, or would not volunteer it as part of their definition, and as such the group could easily be broad enough to include a multitude of opinions.

Good comments. I confess I'm not perfectly clear myself on who self-announced "real Southerners" are, nor precisely how they perceive their "realness," nor why they think some others who happen to live in southern states are less committed to some essential Southernness. I have lived in the South most of my life, several different states, cities, small towns. So I consider myself a Southerner, and real enough. No plans to decamp to Barcelona, speaking of secession.

Easy enough, for me at least, to include obvious "Lost Causers" in the self-perceived "real" category. In the case of Lost Causers, many are surely motivated substantially by opposition to the federal government, big government, federal interference in state affairs, etc. As a symbol of this anti-government stance, they might favor bumper stickers that refer to the Civil War, Confederate money, the battle flag. Or maybe unkind words for Obama, or Democrats, or liberals - none of these latter of which would be limited to bumpers with Southern license plates. Lost Causers come in various guises, and none would be out of place as characters in one or more of the chapters in Tony Horwitz's Confederates in the Attic, the non-reenacter chapters. (Highly recommend this book, btw. Characters, for sure.)

Naturally I don't want to think myself rude; but yes, critical commentary about what I see ill-informed views on the relationship between slavery and secession will not sit well with some. I guess my analysis will seem to some too harsh on the South of 1861, and by extension on too many Southerners in 2016. Whereas I think the analysis is straightforward, based on voluminous evidence as concerns 1861, and lots of examples from then to now, too.

Almost anything about the American South can cause controversy. Hard feelings. Take barbecue, for example.

[ETA - I see Oly Fan has posted why I was composing. Glad he's joined in. Hope others do, too.]

[gumbomoop]

Riffing here on a few of Olympic Fan's points:

As for Lincoln's "evolving" view of slavery, I contend after much reading that he was always personally strongly opposed to slavery, viewing it as a moral crime. But he was also a practical politician whose primary goal was preservation of the Union. That primacy led him to walk a tightrope early in his first term.

I have before on Off-Topic threads recommended William Lee Miller, Lincoln's Virtues: An Ethical Biography, which is mostly about Lincoln in the 1850s, developing an ethic of moral responsibility. Brilliant analysis, great stories, some dramatic, others hilarious, wonderful and consciously non-stuffy writing, followed by the superb second volume, President Lincoln: The Duty of a Statesman.

In the period between Lincoln's election and his inauguration, several politicians fought for compromises to save the Union. Lincoln let it be known that he would support measures to reassure the South about the protection of the slaves they held -- even a constitutional amendment forbidding the government from interfering with slavery in the states where it existed.

A chilling historical irony: had the seceders paused long enough to accept this offer, this would probably have been the 13th Amendment to the Constitution. Think about that, knowing as we do that what eventually became the 13th Amendment made slavery unconstitutional.

Lincoln's willingness to countenance such a slavery-protecting amendment is but one piece of "evidence" used to buttress an argument that Lincoln was fundamentally a racist. His views on slavery and race were very complicated. But also moving steadily in the direction of freedom.

One skeptic pointed out that in the Emancipation Proclamation "Lincoln freed the slaves in places where he had no power to ... he refused to free the slaves in the paces where he had the power to do so." A fair assessment, although in the long run, the emergency war measure turned out to be a brilliant tactical maneuver.

Here's another piece of supposed "evidence" that Lincoln wasn't "really" such a Great Emancipator. As part of that theory [which is not Oly Fan's point] it is sometimes said, by Lincoln critics on both left and right, that "The Emancipation Proclamation didn't free a single slave."

Well, possibly not on January 1, 1863. But in this dull document, too often unnoticed are these crucial words: "... that the Executive government of the United States, including the military and naval authorities thereof, will recognize and maintain the freedom of said persons."

Which is exactly what happened. As the Union armies drove deeper into the Confederacy, many thousands of slaves were freed. By the concrete promise and threat carried in specific words of the Emancipation Proclamation. How did emancipation actually happen? In many different ways. By slaves' own actions. By the terms of Lincoln's Proclamation. And for those not previously made (or become) free, by the 13th Amendment.

[BLPOG]

I tried to give you some history sporks, OF, but I apparently I need to spread 'em around right now.

[Devilwin]

Ok, I'll chime in. Real southerner here. A descendant of 23 veterans of the Army of Northern Virginia. And a proud veteran of the USMC. That would be UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS, not Confederate marine corps. Nobody I know is proud of the fact this was once slave country. It's an evil institution, and I for one am glad it's over here. This is one country now, and thousands of southerners have shed their blood for it. One thing we don't like is constantly being reminded of the Civil War, how it was all our doing, how evil we were, etc. I am sure you know slaveholders were in the tiny minority. Most southerners were small farmers or merchants.
Yet when the north saw the war wasn't going well for them, they changed tactics. Attack the helpless. Burn farms and homes, even whole towns. Make the southern soldiers desert, and they did, draining manpower from the army. It was a brilliant decision, just wage total war. Many in the north even called for the extermination of southern whites.
Grant vs Lee. Grant had over 130,000 men to Lee's 62,000 when they first met in the Wilderness. Yet on the way to Appomattox, Lee out maneuvered Grant again and again, pinning loss after loss on him.
Grant better than Lee? Give me a break. Give Lee another 30,000 men, Grant never sees Richmond.
The real goat of Gettsburgh was Richard Ewell, who allowed the Yankees to fortify the round tops while he sat and watched, after being ordered to take those hills.
All this aside, I admit this rubbed me the wrong way, but I will get over it. I am justly proud of my ancestors that charged the massed Union guns at Gettsburgh, and chased Hooker's mighty army back across the river at Chancellorsville. And these men fought so bravely and so well, but not for a slave, because they had none nor wanted any. Back then, they thought they were fighting an invader, plain and simple.
My two best friends while in service were, Joe, from Burlington, Vermont, and Mike, from Cleveland, Ohio.
We served the USA. Because we are all Americans.

[Olympic Fan]

Ok, I'll chime in. Real southerner here. A descendant of 23 veterans of the Army of Northern Virginia. And a proud veteran of the USMC. That would be UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS, not Confederate marine corps. Nobody I know is proud of the fact this was once slave country. It's an evil institution, and I for one am glad it's over here. This is one country now, and thousands of southerners have shed their blood for it. One thing we don't like is constantly being reminded of the Civil War, how it was all our doing, how evil we were, etc. I am sure you know slaveholders were in the tiny minority. Most southerners were small farmers or merchants.
Yet when the north saw the war wasn't going well for them, they changed tactics. Attack the helpless. Burn farms and homes, even whole towns. Make the southern soldiers desert, and they did, draining manpower from the army. It was a brilliant decision, just wage total war. Many in the north even called for the extermination of southern whites.
Grant vs Lee. Grant had over 130,000 men to Lee's 62,000 when they first met in the Wilderness. Yet on the way to Appomattox, Lee out maneuvered Grant again and again, pinning loss after loss on him.
Grant better than Lee? Give me a break. Give Lee another 30,000 men, Grant never sees Richmond.
The real goat of Gettsburgh was Richard Ewell, who allowed the Yankees to fortify the round tops while he sat and watched, after being ordered to take those hills.
All this aside, I admit this rubbed me the wrong way, but I will get over it. I am justly proud of my ancestors that charged the massed Union guns at Gettsburgh, and chased Hooker's mighty army back across the river at Chancellorsville. And these men fought so bravely and so well, but not for a slave, because they had none nor wanted any. Back then, they thought they were fighting an invader, plain and simple.
My two best friends while in service were, Joe, from Burlington, Vermont, and Mike, from Cleveland, Ohio.
We served the USA. Because we are all Americans.

I appreciate your attitude and I thank you for your service, but have a few quibbles with your points.

I am sure you know slaveholders were in the tiny minority

Part of the myth that keeps getting repeated. The percentage of whites that owned slaves varied from state to state, but according to 1860 census data, 37 percent of the white families in the seven states that first seceded owned slaves ... 25 percent of the white families in the remaining four states own slaves ... overall, over 30 percent of the white families in the South owned slaves -- a minority, true, but not a tiny minority. And that minority were the power brokers in the South, If you look at the legislators in the various states, the great, GREAT majority of them -- the men who took the South to war -- almost all were slave owners.

The real goat of Gettsburgh was Richard Ewell, who allowed the Yankees to fortify the round tops while he sat and watched, after being ordered to take those hills.

Right man, wrong location. Ewell was at the other end of the line, not near the round tops. He was ordered by Lee to take Culp's Hill "if practical". Ewell refused to move, but Lee also refused to follow up on the order -- Ewell didn't launch his attack until the night of the second day of the battle. Stuart also deserves some of the blame -- he was off chasing headlines instead of doing his job screening the army and scouting the Union positions. But they weren't Republicans after the war, so Longstreet, who was right in almost every key point in the battle, was scapegoated. Also, Ewell and Stuart's stupidity doesn't absolve Lee, who fought a terrible battle.

on the way to Appomattox, Lee out maneuvered Grant again and again, pinning loss after loss on him.

Lee did perform well in the Overland campaign -- but he LOST battle after battle as Grant maneuvered him into what amounted were an immobile, fortified position around Petersburg and Richmond. When Grant systematically cut Lee's last lines of communications, Lee was forced to abandon his lines and flee West. Grant acted quickly and trapped Lee at Appomattox. In the Overland campaign, Lee did inflict slightly more casualties than he suffered -- but that's not surprising in a situation where on army is on the defensive and the other is forced to attack. And the margin wasn't that great -- the fact that it was so close was a disaster for the South.

Over the course of the war, Grant's troops suffered 15 percent casualties (according to Whiney and Jamison's Attack and Die, the authoritative study of Civil War casualties). He did do better in the West, where he had a 10.7 percent loss rate, than in the East, where his loss rate was 17.6 percent. Lee's loss rate for the war was over 20 percent (again .. talking killed and wounded ... not missing, which were much higher on the Southern side late in the war as more and more men deserted)

Yes, Grant made some overly aggressive mistakes -- a useless charge at Vicksburg, a bloody charge at Cold Harbor ... but those are small potatoes compared to Lee's devastating frontal assaults at Malvern Hill, Antietam (although on the defensive, some of his counterattacks in that battle were insane) and especially Gettysburg.

Yet when the north saw the war wasn't going well for them, they changed tactics. Attack the helpless. Burn farms and homes, even whole towns. Make the southern soldiers desert, and they did, draining manpower from the army. It was a brilliant decision, just wage total war. Many in the north even called for the extermination of southern whites.

That was the strategy that Grant proposed when he was brought East in March 1864 and appointed overall commander of the Union armies. It was -- as you say -- a brilliant decision and it cut the heart out of the confederacy. Sherman and Sheridan did most of the dirty work while Grant kept Lee's army engaged and prevented the dispatch of reinforcements to Johnson or Bragg. I should note that Grant resisted the calls to exterminate Southern whites -- murder was never part of the campaign (just destruction of property). Technically, that's why it was "hard" war and not "total" war.

Grant better than Lee? Give me a break. Give Lee another 30,000 men, Grant never sees Richmond

It would have been interesting to see them matched up evenly (interesting, but bloody). I will point out that most military historians consider Grant's Vicksburg campaign to be the military masterpiece of the war -- a brilliant campaign against three confederate armies that outnumbered him 3-to-2. I would also argue that most professional military historians -- who are not Lost Cause apologists -- consider Grant the superior general. He consistently won with fewer losses than Lee. And he had a strategic sense that Lee lacked -- his focus on the front in Virginia to the total exclusion of all else, cost the Confederacy badly. On the other hand, once Grant was given command in the spring of 1864, he ended three years of frustration and strategic stalemate, winning the war in 13 months.

Grant was far and away the most successful general on either side in the war. As a junior general in early 1862, he turned the tide of the war in the west with his victories at Ft. Henry and Ft. Donaldson -- trapping a confederate army in the latter and accepting the first major surrender of the war. In July of 1863, he forced the surrender of Pemberton's Army at Vicksburg. Then in the spring of 1865, he accepted the surrender of Lee's Army at Appomattox. At that point, he was the only general on either side to capture an opposing army -- and he did it three times. After Appomatox, there were a number of other surrenders -- Sherman actually presided over the largest surrender in the war at Bennett Place, about five miles from the Duke campus.

[Indoor66]

I expect that this thread is destined to about 10 or so more posts.

[Devilwin]

I appreciate your attitude and I thank you for your service, but have a few quibbles with your points.

I am sure you know slaveholders were in the tiny minority

Part of the myth that keeps getting repeated. The percentage of whites that owned slaves varied from state to state, but according to 1860 census data, 37 percent of the white families in the seven states that first seceded owned slaves ... 25 percent of the white families in the remaining four states own slaves ... overall, over 30 percent of the white families in the South owned slaves -- a minority, true, but not a tiny minority. And that minority were the power brokers in the South, If you look at the legislators in the various states, the great, GREAT majority of them -- the men who took the South to war -- almost all were slave owners.

The real goat of Gettsburgh was Richard Ewell, who allowed the Yankees to fortify the round tops while he sat and watched, after being ordered to take those hills.

Right man, wrong location. Ewell was at the other end of the line, not near the round tops. He was ordered by Lee to take Culp's Hill "if practical". Ewell refused to move, but Lee also refused to follow up on the order -- Ewell didn't launch his attack until the night of the second day of the battle. Stuart also deserves some of the blame -- he was off chasing headlines instead of doing his job screening the army and scouting the Union positions. But they weren't Republicans after the war, so Longstreet, who was right in almost every key point in the battle, was scapegoated. Also, Ewell and Stuart's stupidity doesn't absolve Lee, who fought a terrible battle.

on the way to Appomattox, Lee out maneuvered Grant again and again, pinning loss after loss on him.

Lee did perform well in the Overland campaign -- but he LOST battle after battle as Grant maneuvered him into what amounted were an immobile, fortified position around Petersburg and Richmond. When Grant systematically cut Lee's last lines of communications, Lee was forced to abandon his lines and flee West. Grant acted quickly and trapped Lee at Appomattox. In the Overland campaign, Lee did inflict slightly more casualties than he suffered -- but that's not surprising in a situation where on army is on the defensive and the other is forced to attack. And the margin wasn't that great -- the fact that it was so close was a disaster for the South.

Over the course of the war, Grant's troops suffered 15 percent casualties (according to Whiney and Jamison's Attack and Die, the authoritative study of Civil War casualties). He did do better in the West, where he had a 10.7 percent loss rate, than in the East, where his loss rate was 17.6 percent. Lee's loss rate for the war was over 20 percent (again .. talking killed and wounded ... not missing, which were much higher on the Southern side late in the war as more and more men deserted)

Yes, Grant made some overly aggressive mistakes -- a useless charge at Vicksburg, a bloody charge at Cold Harbor ... but those are small potatoes compared to Lee's devastating frontal assaults at Malvern Hill, Antietam (although on the defensive, some of his counterattacks in that battle were insane) and especially Gettysburg.

Yet when the north saw the war wasn't going well for them, they changed tactics. Attack the helpless. Burn farms and homes, even whole towns. Make the southern soldiers desert, and they did, draining manpower from the army. It was a brilliant decision, just wage total war. Many in the north even called for the extermination of southern whites.

That was the strategy that Grant proposed when he was brought East in March 1864 and appointed overall commander of the Union armies. It was -- as you say -- a brilliant decision and it cut the heart out of the confederacy. Sherman and Sheridan did most of the dirty work while Grant kept Lee's army engaged and prevented the dispatch of reinforcements to Johnson or Bragg. I should note that Grant resisted the calls to exterminate Southern whites -- murder was never part of the campaign (just destruction of property). Technically, that's why it was "hard" war and not "total" war.

Grant better than Lee? Give me a break. Give Lee another 30,000 men, Grant never sees Richmond

It would have been interesting to see them matched up evenly (interesting, but bloody). I will point out that most military historians consider Grant's Vicksburg campaign to be the military masterpiece of the war -- a brilliant campaign against three confederate armies that outnumbered him 3-to-2. I would also argue that most professional military historians -- who are not Lost Cause apologists -- consider Grant the superior general. He consistently won with fewer losses than Lee. And he had a strategic sense that Lee lacked -- his focus on the front in Virginia to the total exclusion of all else, cost the Confederacy badly. On the other hand, once Grant was given command in the spring of 1864, he ended three years of frustration and strategic stalemate, winning the war in 13 months.

Grant was far and away the most successful general on either side in the war. As a junior general in early 1862, he turned the tide of the war in the west with his victories at Ft. Henry and Ft. Donaldson -- trapping a confederate army in the latter and accepting the first major surrender of the war. In July of 1863, he forced the surrender of Pemberton's Army at Vicksburg. Then in the spring of 1865, he accepted the surrender of Lee's Army at Appomattox. At that point, he was the only general on either side to capture an opposing army -- and he did it three times. After Appomatox, there were a number of other surrenders -- Sherman actually presided over the largest surrender in the war at Bennett Place, about five miles from the Duke campus.

The fact is less than 13% of southerners owned slaves. At least in the Carolinas. I disagree with your assessment of the Overland Campaign, Lee beat Grant at the Wilderness, Spotsylvania, North Anna, Cold Harbor (where hundreds of wounded Union soldiers died of exposure because Grant dallied for nine days because he thought asking for said truce would mean admitting defeat) and other less glamorous battles.
And I honestly believe you are right about it being Culp's Hill.
What if it had been Stonewall there instead of Ewell? In my opinion, Jackson may have been the best general officer of the war on either side. Look at his Valley Campaign.

Grant himself called the effort of the Army of Northern Virginia "Herculean."
Sherman said, "Give me southern infantry and northern artillery and I'll whip any army in the world".
Many Union generals praised the southern soldiers, including Joshua Chamberlain, who said "How can we not welcome such men back into the Union"!
But it seems as southerners, we're never quite fully back in the Union. No matter how many years pass, we are told, "Forget your history. Burn or hide your flags. Get rid of that accent". Do what we say now, take down your memorials to your brave soldiers. Act like us, talk like us, forget your ancestors ever existed."
And, the worst thing of all is this. Now we have to take this from northern transplants that come down here and tell us just how ill informed we are right to our faces. And usually we ignore it, as we should. Because we believed in America in 1776, 1861, 1917, 1941, 1960,and now, we believe in this country in 2016.
And any southern boy alive will take up arms to protect the freedom of those people that look down their noses at us and besmirch our values, our integrity, and even our intelligence, and our heritage. And you know what? We will do it again and again, because we love this land as much as they do, maybe even more!

[Mike Corey]

Just wanted to thank you all for this education. Carry on.

[Devilwin]

Just wanted to thank you all for this education. Carry on.

No charge. Class is over til tomorrow!

[Olympic Fan]

The fact is less than 13% of southerners owned slaves. At least in the Carolinas. I disagree with your assessment of the Overland Campaign, Lee beat Grant at the Wilderness, Spotsylvania, North Anna, Cold Harbor (where hundreds of wounded Union soldiers died of exposure because Grant dallied for nine days because he thought asking for said truce would mean admitting defeat) and other less glamorous battles.
And I honestly believe you are right about it being Culp's Hill.
What if it had been Stonewall there instead of Ewell? In my opinion, Jackson may have been the best general officer of the war on either side. Look at his Valley Campaign.

Grant himself called the effort of the Army of Northern Virginia "Herculean."
Sherman said, "Give me southern infantry and northern artillery and I'll whip any army in the world".
Many Union generals praised the southern soldiers, including Joshua Chamberlain, who said "How can we not welcome such men back into the Union"!
But it seems as southerners, we're never quite fully back in the Union. No matter how many years pass, we are told, "Forget your history. Burn or hide your flags. Get rid of that accent". Do what we say now, take down your memorials to your brave soldiers. Act like us, talk like us, forget your ancestors ever existed."
And, the worst thing of all is this. Now we have to take this from northern transplants that come down here and tell us just how ill informed we are right to our faces. And usually we ignore it, as we should. Because we believed in America in 1776, 1861, 1917, 1941, 1960,and now, we believe in this country in 2016.
And any southern boy alive will take up arms to protect the freedom of those people that look down their noses at us and besmirch our values, our integrity, and even our intelligence, and our heritage. And you know what? We will do it again and again, because we love this land as much as they do, maybe even more!

The fact is less than 13% of southerners owned slaves

One of those "facts" that is right ... but wrong. As a percentage of the white population, that 13 percent figure may be right for the South overall. Think about a Southern family -- a father, a mother, a grandmother and five children (families tended to be bigger in those days). They own a slave. That's one slave for eight people -- 12.5 percent. But ALL eight of them have a vested interest in slavery. That's why measuring the slave-owning FAMILIES is a better measure -- and the correct figure is 30 percent of Southern familes owned slaves (just slightly lower in North Carolina). And, as I pointed out, the most powerful people in the South -- the ones who drove secession -- were slave owners.

Lee beat Grant at the Wilderness, Spotsylvania, North Anna, Cold Harbor (where hundreds of wounded Union soldiers died of exposure because Grant dallied for nine days because he thought asking for said truce would mean admitting defeat) and other less glamorous battles.

Disagree with all of this. In comes down to how you measure victory. For instance, the South celebrated Lee's 1862 "victory" at the Seven Days campaign because he drove McClellan's army away from Richmond. Did it matter than he suffered significantly higher losses in the campaign (20,000) than McClellan (16,000)? So who "won" the Seven Days? Chancellorsville is often rated as Lee's greatest victory. He did drive Hooker back over the Rappahannock. But he actually lost more men killed in the battle than the Union (1,665 to 1,606). Who won Chancellorsville?

During the Overland campaign, Grant's goal was to engage the Confederate army and drive it out of the open, where it could maneuver, and force it into its fixed defenses around Richmond. Sure, he'd have loved to have destroyed Lee's Army at Wilderness or Spotsylvania or North Anna or Cold Harbor, but each of those battles succeeded in driving Lee's Army where Grant wanted it to go. He hit Lee's Army at the Wilderness and the two sides fought each other to a standstill. On the morning of May 7, instead of bludgeoning his opponent, he maneuvered, marching South to try and beat Lee to the vital crossroads at Spotslvania Courthouse. Lee got there first (barely) and another battle ensued. Grant just maneuvered again. For a month, the two armies grappled ... in contact almost every day, until Grant got across the James River in mid-June and Lee had no choice, but to fall back to his siege lines.

Union losses in the campaign were heavier than the considerable Confederate losses. But in the end, Grant maneuvered Lee into the trap ... the trap that would win the war for the Union. You can count the individual battles as "victories" if you want since the Confederates did inflict heavier losses. But the campaign ended in a decisive union victory -- very similar to Lee's decisive victory in the Seven Days.

What if it had been Stonewall there instead of Ewell? In my opinion, Jackson may have been the best general officer of the war on either side. Look at his Valley Campaign.

Jackson was a great commander and his Valley Campaign was brilliant. So was his flank attack at Chancellorsville. But before we go anointing Stonewall, study his inept performance in the Seven Days Battle.

we believed in America in 1776, 1861, 1917, 1941, 1960,and now, we believe in this country in 2016.

If Southerners had believed in America in 1861, there wouldn't have been a Civil War. As for the rest or your dates, no question our forefathers displayed great patriotism and performed admirably.

But the secessionists of 1861 tried to destroy America. While they did fight bravely and well, I can't celebrate the cause they fought for (and my family has been in North Carolina since before the Revolutionary War).

[Devilwin]

The fact is less than 13% of southerners owned slaves

One of those "facts" that is right ... but wrong. As a percentage of the white population, that 13 percent figure may be right for the South overall. Think about a Southern family -- a father, a mother, a grandmother and five children (families tended to be bigger in those days). They own a slave. That's one slave for eight people -- 12.5 percent. But ALL eight of them have a vested interest in slavery. That's why measuring the slave-owning FAMILIES is a better measure -- and the correct figure is 30 percent of Southern familes owned slaves (just slightly lower in North Carolina). And, as I pointed out, the most powerful people in the South -- the ones who drove secession -- were slave owners.

Lee beat Grant at the Wilderness, Spotsylvania, North Anna, Cold Harbor (where hundreds of wounded Union soldiers died of exposure because Grant dallied for nine days because he thought asking for said truce would mean admitting defeat) and other less glamorous battles.

Disagree with all of this. In comes down to how you measure victory. For instance, the South celebrated Lee's 1862 "victory" at the Seven Days campaign because he drove McClellan's army away from Richmond. Did it matter than he suffered significantly higher losses in the campaign (20,000) than McClellan (16,000)? So who "won" the Seven Days? Chancellorsville is often rated as Lee's greatest victory. He did drive Hooker back over the Rappahannock. But he actually lost more men killed in the battle than the Union (1,665 to 1,606). Who won Chancellorsville?

During the Overland campaign, Grant's goal was to engage the Confederate army and drive it out of the open, where it could maneuver, and force it into its fixed defenses around Richmond. Sure, he'd have loved to have destroyed Lee's Army at Wilderness or Spotsylvania or North Anna or Cold Harbor, but each of those battles succeeded in driving Lee's Army where Grant wanted it to go. He hit Lee's Army at the Wilderness and the two sides fought each other to a standstill. On the morning of May 7, instead of bludgeoning his opponent, he maneuvered, marching South to try and beat Lee to the vital crossroads at Spotslvania Courthouse. Lee got there first (barely) and another battle ensued. Grant just maneuvered again. For a month, the two armies grappled ... in contact almost every day, until Grant got across the James River in mid-June and Lee had no choice, but to fall back to his siege lines.

Union losses in the campaign were heavier than the considerable Confederate losses. But in the end, Grant maneuvered Lee into the trap ... the trap that would win the war for the Union. You can count the individual battles as "victories" if you want since the Confederates did inflict heavier losses. But the campaign ended in a decisive union victory -- very similar to Lee's decisive victory in the Seven Days.

What if it had been Stonewall there instead of Ewell? In my opinion, Jackson may have been the best general officer of the war on either side. Look at his Valley Campaign.

Jackson was a great commander and his Valley Campaign was brilliant. So was his flank attack at Chancellorsville. But before we go anointing Stonewall, study his inept performance in the Seven Days Battle.

we believed in America in 1776, 1861, 1917, 1941, 1960,and now, we believe in this country in 2016.

If Southerners had believed in America in 1861, there wouldn't have been a Civil War. As for the rest or your dates, no question our forefathers displayed great patriotism and performed admirably.

But the secessionists of 1861 tried to destroy America. While they did fight bravely and well, I can't celebrate the cause they fought for (and my family has been in North Carolina since before the Revolutionary War).

You said, Grant WON those battles. In fact, he LOST the battles. He did however, sidle to the south each time instead of retreating as his predecessors did, and this, since his army was constantly getting reinforced while Lee's was draining, led to the Union victory. Sheridan was burning every thing in the Shenandoah Valley, and Union forces throughout the south were doing the same. Many southern soldiers deserted to get home and protect their families, as they knew the federals were sparing no one, plantations and small farms alike were all being put to the torch. My grandmother told me how her great grandmother said Yankees stole both of their horses, took their only cow, and slaughtered the poultry, which they proceeded to dump in the well! They then torched the barn (however to their credit, they spared the three room home) before burning the scant four acres of corn and other crops they had. Not a slave on the place.

As for the difference in casualty numbers, percentage wise. Both armies initially fought battles in the old style, line up and shoot at each other. Problem was, the newer rifled barrelled muskets were much more accurate. Neither side seemed to get it at first, and casualties were horrendous. Attacking troops would take tremendous slaughter, as witnessed by Union losses at Fredricksburg , Cold Harbor, and Confederate losses at Malvern Hill, and Picket's Charge at Gettysburg.
Lee was let down by Jackson somewhat in the Seven Days battles, as old Stonewall was slow and not his usual aggressive self, but like Grant in the Overland Campaign, Lee achieved the objective, driving McClellan away from Richmond.
There was no doubt that the southern troops were more aggressive than their Union counterparts, mainly because they were fighting on southern soil and defending hearth and home. Even though the north had a sizeable manpower advantage, the south's overall better leadership "kept them in the game", so to speak. But attacking fortified positions like Lee did at Gettysburg and Burnside did at Fredricksburg often yielded horrible results.
Lee's biggest fault (which he admitted) was his overconfidence in his incomparable soldiers. Time and time again they met a larger northern army and sent it reeling back in defeat. Underfed and often wearing ragged uniforms or just plain homespun clothing, some shoeless, they continued to win. Lincoln himself wondered aloud how "the finest army on the planet" could be handled by an army of ragamuffins".
Lee should have listened to Longstreet's counsel at Gettysburg, move to the right, interpose between Meade and Washington, make the Federals attack, and possibly destroy the Union army. Gettysburg was the place where the war was won for the north, in my opinion. Although the Army of Northern Virginia fought on and won more victories, it was never again the sharp instrument of destruction it once was. And this battle gave the northern army confidence. Its soldiers were always brave, yet often poorly led.

It's true the south should take the share of blame for slavery often ascribed to it. But.
The north also has a share too, but one rarely hears of this. Most slaves came into this country by the lucrative northern slave trade. Ports in Massachusetts, New York, Rhode Island had booming slave ports, and many other jobs sprang from this trade. Plantation owners got most of their slaves from Yankees.
So we should not be so quick to cast stones at the south when the north shares in this burden just as much as they do. And that's a fact.
Also, my ancestors too were in NC before the revolution, two fought at Guilford Courthouse.

[CDu]

Olympic, I think you are straddling the fence a bit here. On the one hand, you denounce %/# dead as a measure of success, then you discredit Lee's successes because he lost more men in winning positionally. Seems it is either one or the other.

[Devilwin]

One thing about % of battle deaths. The much more populous north could afford more battle deaths. Southern soldiers, if you look at it by %, stood a greater chance of dying in battle.
Figures show:
Union battle deaths- 110,000
Confederate battle deaths -94,000
Total Union deaths - 360,222
Total Confederate deaths - 258,877
Many more men died from disease and other causes than from battle. Southern farm boys suffered from diseases more than any other group because these illnesses were often relatively unknown among scattered, rural populations, and the farm boys had little resistance to them, plus the northern soldier had better food and medical care.

[ncexnyc]

And here I thought our members only twisted statistics to suit their need during the basketball season.

Carry on gentlemen.

[Devilwin]

And here I thought our members only twisted statistics to suit their need during the basketball season.

Carry on gentlemen.

Lol. Good one. But although I am past midnight, not quite old enough to have seen these casualties first hand, so I have to rely on the ramblings of so called experts..lol

[Olympic Fan]

Olympic, I think you are straddling the fence a bit here. On the one hand, you denounce %/# dead as a measure of success, then you discredit Lee's successes because he lost more men in winning positionally. Seems it is either one or the other.

Sorry if I am unclear. I thought was pointing out Devilwin's contradiction -- and trying to make the point that victory is not always determined by comparing losses.

I DO think the Seven Days was a decisive victory for Lee, even he did suffer significantly more losses than McClellan. He accomplished his aim of driving the Union troops away from Richmond.

I'm merely arguing that Grant's Overland Campaign was the mirror of Lee's Seven Days campaign. Grant did suffer heavier losses than Lee, but he accomplished his aim of driving the Army of Northern Virginia out of the field and back to its fortifications. It's funny, but after the Overland Campaign in the summer of 1864, the two armies were in almost exactly the same position as before Lee's Seven Days campaign in the summer of 1862.

Why then do so many half-educated people consider Lee a genius and Grant a butcher (especially since over the course of the war, Grant lost a smaller percentage of his troops than Lee did)?

In fact, Grant had the lowest loss rate of any important general in the war .. with one exception: Joseph E. Johnston.

It's generally regarded by Southerners as a stoke of fortune that Joe Johnston was wounded outside Richmond at the Battle of Seven Pines and ceded command of the main Confederate Army (soon to be dubbed the Army of Northern Virginia) to Lee (who had been serving as Davis' military advisor). I'm not sure it was good fortune for the South. Johnston was criticized throughout the war for being slow and defensive-minded, while Lee was unquestionable aggressive and offensive-minded.

But in hindsight, didn't Johnston have the right idea? As Devilwin pointed out, the generals on both sides had trouble adjusting to the fact that using Napoleonic tactics in an era of rifled muskets just didn't work. Well-positioned defensive troops were almost always at a tactical advantage. The South started the war with a manpower disadvantage. But Lee made it worse by almost always assuming the offensive. Even when he was in a defensive situation, his strategy was to counterattack -- the best example was Antietam, where McClellan was committed to attack. Lee's tactics threw thousands of lives away in futile assaults. How much better off would his army have been if his men had dug in and fought defensively? That's what Longstreet wanted to do a Gettysburg -- maneuver the army between Meade's impregnable position south of Gettysburg and Washington, then find a strong defensive position and let Meade break his army attacking Lee.

Johnston essentially used that tactic to great effect as Sherman drove on Atlanta. He frustrated the Union general with his tactical savvy -- usually by holding a strong defensive position and forcing Sherman either to bleed his men with frontal attacks or to waste time with more maneuvers. He did it with very small wastage of his men. Of course, the Confederate leaders couldn't see that -- they wanted Lee-style counterattacks. So Johnston was removed, John Bell Hood (who had undermined Johnston) took over his army and launched the kind of attacks that Jefferson Davis wanted. Four major attacks bled Hood's army (he lost 20,000 men in a month) and didn't slow Sherman -- he was in Atlanta six weeks after Hood took over.

Would the South have fared better with Johnston in command in Virginia, rather than Lee?

I'm not sure I would go that far, but I suspect it would have had some benefits. For one thing, Johnston wouldn't have been able to stubbornly resist the temporarily transfer of his troops to the West as Lee did. It's always been one of the great failures of the Confederacy -- it's failure to use its interior lines to concentrate local superiority against various Union armies. And I suspect with Johnston in command, we'd have had more Fredricksburgs and less Chancellorsvilles.

It's interesting to contemplate.

[WV_Iron_Duke]

Unlike Malvern Hill and Pickett's Charge, I don't think Antietam is a good example of Lee throwing thousands of men away in futile attacks. Hooker started the epic battle coming from the North Woods near the pike. Hood, then only a brigade commander, later counter attacked through the cornfield with huge casualties. That was the only major counter attack in the 3 front struggle. Antietam was the last major battle were fortifications were not used. By the Wilderness campaign Civil War tactics resembled those of 50 years later.